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Abstract 
Hunter, Tiffany B. M.A. Applied Behavioral Science, Wright State University, 
2014. American Insanity: The Demise of the Elite and a Critical/Historical Analysis of 
the DSM. 
 
 
 
The International Classification of Diseases, Sixth Edition (ICD-6; World Health 
Organization, 1949) is a universal health care management tool for examining the 
pathology of diseases and how to properly diagnose and treat said diseases. The birth of 
the first edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-I; 
American Psychiatric Association, 1952) is the product of the ICD and the American 
Medico-psychological Association and first delivered shortly after the end of the Second 
World War. As per request of the American Armed Forces, which were ill-equipped to 
manage the surge of mental disorders after the war, the need for a uniform classification 
system to diagnose the rising number of disorders classified as numerous names and 
symptoms, or inexistent in medical nomenclature, was perceived to be undoubtedly dire. 
Unlike the ICD, the DSM was constructed particularly for American 
classifications of mental disorders and psychosis, both organic and inorganic, which 
would in the course of over 60 years expand its diagnosis to thousands of American 
civilians. Since the first publication of the DSM, there have been six additional 
publications that essentially define what is “normal” and “deviant” as it relates to social 
behavior and function. The purpose of this research is to examine the trend of Axis II 
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personality disorders within DSM-I through V (APA, 1952 & 2013) in regards to its 
continually revised definition of the boundaries of American normalcy and the “other”1; 
its impact on social behavior, economic disparity; the implications of corralling the 
masses through medicalization; and an ideation of political dominance that presumes to 
know what is best for the general population. By utilizing the seven editions of the DSM 
to examine the literature within the manuals, it will assist in guiding through the trends of 
personality disorder classifications per edition in comparison to a necessity for 
controlling maladaptive behaviors. With this information in hand, it will facilitate in the 
evaluation of how compartmentalized human behavior has become in relation to a limited 
knowledge of the social spectrum. 
  
                                                             
1 The “other”, as it relates to the argument, represents an established prototype of 
“normal” (i.e. ethnic, racial, and behavioral) by articulating what is abnormal within a 
society structured by a class system. Likewise, the “other” relates to citizens of nations 
abroad, both racially and ethnically, that do not adhere to American values. 
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I. Chapter One 
Introduction and Goals Statement 
Shortly after the end of the Second World War, the United States would find itself 
fighting another war – an internal conflict of discipline between the approach and 
practices of professional psychology. Ill-equipped to manage the surge of mental disorder 
prevalence after the war, the perceived or felt need for a uniform classification system to 
diagnose the rising number of disorders known under numerous names and symptoms (or 
inexistence thereof) became perceivably dire. The birth of the first edition of the 
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-I; APA, 1952) was the 
product of the International Classification of Diseases (ICD-6; WHO, 1949) and the 
American Medico-psychological Association, shared and guided by the American Armed 
Forces. Unlike the ICD, the DSM was constructed particularly for American 
classifications of mental disorders and psychosis, both organic and inorganic, which 
would in the course of over 60 years expand its diagnosis to thousands of American 
civilians.  
 By researching Axis II2 personality disorders within the American Psychological 
Association’s DSM-I through DSM-V (APA, 1952 & 2013), peer reviewed articles, 
commentaries, and scholarly publications, I have developed two hypotheses. First, the 
                                                             
2 The use of Axes in the DSM did not begin until the DSM-III (APA, 1980). 
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transition from psychoanalysis to psychiatry in the DSM-III (American Psychiatric 
Association, 1980) – a discipline of psychology that was previously associated strictly 
with institutionalization (Strand, 2011) – resulted in an expected increase in the average 
amount of personality disorder classifications. Second, since the introduction of 
psychiatry as the dominant discipline of professional psychology, the anticipated 
revisions and refinement of published personality disorder classifications correlates in a 
political manner which separates American behavior from the “other” as well as from one 
another. 
The construction of American normalcy as the standard is based on shared, pre-
existing, and non-critically examined cultural constructs. Using a critical theoretical 
approach, I posit that the DSM is best understood as generated by a political conflict for 
dominance of disciplines and rationality, as well an elitist dominance of the subservient 
and the “other”. Congruent with the aforementioned, the DSM defines a standard of 
“normal” by structuring what is not normal; that is, behavior that displays symptoms 
outside of normative expectations for behavior. Disorder, as it relates to psychiatry, is a 
slight-to-radical deviation from the manifestation of what is prescribed as acceptable 
behavior. Disorder, in turn, compromises the authority of the elite by compromising its 
self-worth. Therefore, the power and significance of an autonomous (elitist) authority is 
only affirmed in such a position so long as the subservient population under its regime 
experiences it as meaningful without force or contradiction. However, immediate 
attention and uprising against Democratic unfreedom is distracted by a “satisfaction of 
‘false needs’, which are themselves created by the system of mass consumption and 
popular culture,” (Yar, 2012, p. 55).  
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Since the DSM is an American publication posing to examine and deconstruct 
social behavior of Americans, it cannot be applicable to other nations or cultures, which 
is both its benefit and Achillean weakness. Unlike biomedical practices, non-Western 
cultures do not view personality disorders in the same regard as Western cultures (and 
more specifically, American culture). Instead, their beliefs assume that personalities are 
not deviant or maladaptive, but simply reveal an individual’s different path and 
perception of life (Nikelly, 1992). I aim to explore the assumption that standardization of 
normal behavior is secondary to the creation of prototypical constructions of deviant 
behavior, which are instruments in methods of social control and preservation of political 
power by corralling and subduing the masses.  
In light of this assumption, an overarching medical jurisdiction may be to the 
benefit of pharmaceutical, biomedical and technological industries in the capitalist setting 
of the United States by collaborating in multiple venues which will reap profit and 
control, while covertly encouraging dependence. I will supplement this assumption by 
introducing the theory of medicalization in Chapter Four (Conrad, 2007), followed by 
comparing the classification specificity and numerical expansion in volume size within 
Axis II personality disorders from DSM-I to DSM-III, where there is a transition of 
discipline from psychoanalysis to psychiatry. Furthermore, I will be reviewing the actual 
number of personality disorders published per edition (DSM-I through V; Chapter Four) 
and searching for shared characteristics in classifications within each publication 
(Chapter Three).  
To comprehend what defines truth, it is imperative to historically deconstruct 
current confines of facts from a skeptical approach in order to question knowledge. To 
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mute irrationality, the popular approach in America is to remedy with institutionalization 
either through clinics, imprisonment, medicalization, social sedation (discussed in 
Chapter Three) or any combination of the aforementioned. With the recent release of the 
newest edition of the DSM in 2013, the importance of the current research is to 
rationalize that the DSM is not perfect and dependence on this particular instrument may 
cause more harm than benefit to American civilians. To begin, the current chapter will 
provide background insight to the historical conception and reproduction of the DSM. 
Likewise, a politico-economical examination of the ever-advancing technological 
lifestyle that enchants and controls the subservient American population will demonstrate 
a manipulated extravagance of alienated patterns of behavior and thought. In light of the 
opening chapter, I pose this question: Did the creation of the DSM exist to explain 
deviant behavior (a posteriori justification), or were deviant behaviors a priori 
knowledge to its construction? 
Historical context of the ICD and DSM 
Despite the publication year of the sixth edition of the ICD in 1949, five earlier 
editions made production through the International Statistical Institute3. During a 
conference in Vienna in 1891, a committee was formed where Jacques Bertillon4 was 
                                                             
3 World Health Organization. Date of publication is unknown. 
4 (1851-1922), Chief of Statistical Services of the City of Paris, whose position detailed 
the classification of causes of death. “The classification prepared by Bertillon's 
committee was based on the classification of causes of death used by the City of Paris, 
which, since its revision in 1885, represented a synthesis of English, German, and Swiss 
classifications,” World Health Organization, retrieved from History of the development 
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named chairman. The Bertillon Classification of Causes of Death would be first 
introduced to the Americas in the mid-1890s in Mexico, and later introduced to the 
United States at the end of the 1890s (WHO). The responsibility of the Bertillon 
Classification of Causes of Death was to publish statistics pertaining to the causes of 
death as those classifications applied to the specific country every ten years, which would 
prove a difficult feat to accomplish in later editions. The World Health Organization 
would replace the Bertillon Classification of Causes of Death with the International 
Classification of Diseases (ICD; WHO, 1949), a healthcare management tool for 
examining the epistemology of diseases and how to properly diagnose and treat said 
diseases. 
 The benefit of the ICD was its universal utility, but the United States began their 
excursion for an American classification system by the end of the roaring clamor in the 
1920s. In 1917, through the formulation and adoption of a “uniform statistics in hospitals 
for mental disease,” (DSM-I; APA, 1952, p. v) psychology managed to situate itself in a 
more favorable position in comparison to a “large body of American medicine” (p. v) as 
it pertains to standardized nomenclature. Despite the instrumentation of a classification 
plan designated as “primarily a statistical classification” (p. v), the Committee on 
Statistics of the American Psychiatric Association (previously known as the American 
Medico-psychological Association) employed such a plan for limited classification of 
mental disorders for nomenclature as well. Problematic in its own construction, 
nomenclature differed from institution to institution, as each educational facility 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
of the ICD (http://www.who.int/classifications/icd/en/HistoryOfICD.pdf) on September 
29, 2013. Note: date of publication is not established in the document. 
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“employed a system of its own origination,” (p. v) that fulfilled their local, immediate 
needs. 
By 1932, the first National Conference on Nomenclature of Disease composed a 
trial edition of proposed nomenclature to distribute to a selection of hospitals. By the 
following year, the first edition of the Standard Classified Nomenclature of Disease was 
published and largely implemented within two years. The changes in the section 
regarding Mental Disorders of the Standard Nomenclature of Diseases and Operations 
remained relatively consistent during the two revised editions in 1933 and 1942, but the 
original nomenclature from 1933 remained the official diagnostic nomenclature for 
medical records and standardizing. When America entered into WWII, civilian and 
military psychiatry were utilizing nomenclature “developed primarily for the needs and 
case loads of public mental hospitals,” (DSM-I; APA, 1952, p. vi) which would soon 
prove problematic. 
Psychiatric caseloads increased as mobilization during the Second World War 
ensued and the need for accurate accounts of morbidity required an appropriate diagnosis 
by a psychiatrist, but it was not practiced among civilians. The classification and 
diagnoses of active duty military personnel became very important, but lacked a standard 
for nomenclature and criteria, which is imperative. Military psychiatrists, induction 
station psychiatrists, and Veterans Administration psychiatrists utilized a separate system 
of nomenclature from one another, resulting in different diagnoses for one individual per 
system. As stated in the foreword of the first edition of the DSM (APA, 1952), “Only 
about 10% of the total cases seen fell into any of the categories ordinarily seen in public 
mental hospitals,” (p. vi) thereby restricting nomenclature to an expanding caseload. 
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Consequentially, psychosomatic disorders were classified by a gastroenterologist or 
cardiologist and incorporated into wartime nomenclature. For example, men who were 
reacting to considerable amounts of immediate stress were categorized as 
“psychoneurotic”, and minor personality disturbances were classified as “psychopathic 
personality” (DSM-I; APA, 1952). 
Nevertheless, many of these soldiers who were once labeled as “psychoneurotic” 
or “psychopathic” did not match the contingencies of either label in subsequent studies. 
Therefore, during this time of heavy attention to psychiatric evaluation regarding reactive 
stress to combat experienced by soldiers in the war, terms were invented by medical 
professionals to satisfy classification standards. Thus, the previous system of 
nomenclature previously utilized became archaic and futile. Continuing with this trend in 
makeshift adjustments, by 1944, the Navy altered some of the nomenclature from the 
Mental Disorders of the Standard Nomenclature of Diseases and Operations to fit the 
disturbances mentioned above, while striving to stay within the limitations of the 
Standard. By 1945, the Army made further revisions with disregard for the Standard, 
“attempting to express present day concepts of mental disturbance,” (DSM-I; APA, 1952, 
p. vii) a trend which was eventually incorporated by all of the branches of the American 
Armed Forces.  
During the following year, the Veterans Administration adopted a similar style of 
nomenclature. By 1948, a similar rubric of classified mental disorders was revised and 
categorized in the International Statistical Classification. Likewise, the standards of 
nomenclature set in 1942 were obliterated to a pile of confusion and at least three 
separate standards of nomenclature were utilized, including the Standard Classified 
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Nomenclature of Disease, Armed Forces, and Veterans Administration – none of which 
coincided with the International Statistical Classification. As highlighted in the foreword 
of the first edition of the DSM (APA, 1952), “One agency found itself in the 
uncomfortable position of using one nomenclature for clinical use, a different one for 
disability rating, and the International for statistical work,” (p. vii). Aside from the 
modifications previously implemented in teaching intuitions, psychiatrists returning from 
military duty in the Armed Forces introduced an assortment of nomenclature 
modifications, and then incorporated them into many clinics and hospitals (DSM-I; APA, 
1952). 
The successes and shortcomings of the various systems of nomenclature provided 
by the Army and Veterans Administration were used as examples by the National 
Committee of Mental Hygiene for revision considerations of the current Standard. Along 
with the material utilized from the aforementioned agencies, psychiatric teaching quarters 
were probed for ideas regarding diseases and nomenclature – including organic brain 
disorders. The efforts that were made to acquire any possible information from experts in 
American psychiatry, and literature concerning such, were incorporated into 
brainstorming for the newest revision. Statistical aspects, something not previously 
utilized, facilitated the conception of a trial revision of official psychiatric nomenclature 
that was distributed to 10% of the members in the American Psychiatric Association by 
April 19505. This included members’ addresses selected from geographical listings, 10% 
                                                             
5 American Psychiatric Association (1952). Note: The Foreword explains that the 
selection of members was attributed to the position that was held to provide complete 
coverage to each aspect of psychiatry in order to receive fair sampling from the included 
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from each state and Canada, whom would receive a trial revised copy and an additional 
nine-page questionnaire for the purposes of opinions and suggestions (APA, 1952).  
Given that each member received a 3-month deadline to review the revision and 
complete the questionnaire, it is not surprising that out of the 520 copies distributed only 
241 were returned prior to July, 1950. From the returned questionnaires, 224 (93%) 
expressed approval, 11 (5%) expressed disapproval, and 6 (2%) of respondents expressed 
neutrality towards the proposed revision (DSM-I; APA, 1952). Albeit that more than half 
of the reviewers left specific suggestions and recommendations in their comments, the 
lowest rating of approval for any section did not sink below 72% (DSM-I; APA, 1952). A 
short period of time for completion of the questionnaire may skew the perception of the 
revised edition in a favorable light. The members of the American Psychiatric 
Association who did not receive follow-up notifications concerning their absent 
questionnaires may have directly contributed to the biased statistics for approval of the 
first trial edition.  
A large proportion of reviewers claimed to address the revision in discussions 
with colleagues and meetings with staff members of mental hospitals, clinics, and other 
administrative groups. The fraction of returned questionnaires began another round of 
revisions in 1950, using the same method as before to obtain authorization by Council to 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
groups:  American Neurological Association, American Psychoanalytic Association, 
Academy of Neurology, American Psychopathological Association, to name a few. 
“Members of the staffs of State Departments of Mental Health were included in order to 
obtain an expression of opinion from such departments concerning the statistical and 
clinical impact of the proposed revision,” (p. ix). 
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the Standard Nomenclature for the edition written in 1951 (APA, 1952) with the goal of 
publication by the American Psychiatric Association. In the fashion of an epic heroic tale, 
the foreword of the first edition of the DSM (American Psychiatric Association, 1952) 
details how involved the federal government has been in regards to the collection of 
etiology of mental disorders. As it details, “Delegated from year to year on a fiscal basis 
to the Bureau of the Census, morbidity statistics in this most important area perhaps 
would never have been collected had it not been for the untiring efforts of former 
Committees on Statistics of the American Psychiatric Association and the National 
Committee on Mental Hygiene,” (DSM-I; American Psychiatric Association, 1952, p. x). 
The birth of the first edition of the DSM was the product of collaborative effort 
between the ICD, National Committee of Mental Hygiene, and American Medico-
psychological Association, which was delivered shortly after the Second World War. The 
Committee on Nomenclature and Statistics, a section of the American Psychiatric 
Association, collaborated with the National Committee for Mental Hygiene (renamed the 
National Association for Mental Health) for the publication of the DSM. After receiving 
approval by the Committee on Nomenclature and Statistics and agreement with the 
National Association for Mental Health, the Mental Hospital Service of the APA received 
authority for publishing future publications of the DSM. However, the first publication of 
the DSM represents the nomenclature of the section concerning Diseases of the 
Psychobiologic Unit within the Standard Nomenclature of Diseases and Operations, 
Fourth Edition (American Psychiatric Association, 1952). 
In the following chapter, an application of Herbert Marcuse’s (1964) concepts of 
one-dimensionality, falsified rationality and dialectical thought will assist in analyzing 
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the characteristics of capitalism, the elitist class’ construction of standardized behavior, 
and its effect on the general population. Specifically, the pattern of change within each 
publication of the DSM’s personality disorders is adaptive as it relates to the cultural 
beliefs of what is deviant behavior. Moreover, the introduction of the Five-Factor Model 
(FFM)6, described by McCrae and Costa (1999) as “a dimensional model that consists of 
five broad domains […] that can be further differentiated into more specific facets” (see 
Widiger, 2005, p. 495) of human behavior will assist in the deconstruction of a 
contradictory continuum.
                                                             
6 Costa & McCrae (1992). NEO Personality Inventory – Revised (Neo-PI-R)  
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Chapter Two 
 
“The major change, of course, was the substitution of the newly accepted 
terminology for the old. Many of the new terms were broader in scope 
than the old to conform to the basic thinking among psychiatrists that 
some disorders or reactions formerly considered as separate clinical 
entities are really expressions of a single disease,” (DSM-I; American 
Psychiatric Association, 1952, p. 103).  
 
 Herbert Marcuse’s one-dimensional theoretical approach in One-Dimensional 
Man (1964) strongly coincides with Veblen’s critique of the leisure class, where the 
desires and needs of the laborer are represented as identical in necessity. The presented 
desires are conspicuous consumptions of the dominant class and their specific politico-
economic interests to impose as rational and purposeful. The allure of the desires, known 
as “false needs” (Marcuse, 1964), maintain a status quo manifesting itself as materialistic 
values in an object-fueled society. The concept of “false needs” represents a 
superimposed need or desire upon the individual by particular social interests; in turn, 
this masks an individual’s true or basic needs (those of which are necessary to survive) 
for distraction of an assumed internal drive to belong to a group or society as a whole. As 
a result,  
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individuals in a technologically-advanced, capitalist society quantify their worth and satisfaction 
by the quantity and quality of their possessions. Therefore, by assuming that an individual’s 
needs and desires are one in the same, an individual’s needs are based on the needs of dominant 
conception (Kertzer, 1979), or what is socially accepted, yet not articulated, as common sense. 
More specifically, they are the needs which render servitude and rationalism via control of 
societal institutions and their interests. As Marcuse (1964) argues, 
“The distinguishing feature of advanced industrial society is its effective 
suffocation of those needs which demand liberation – liberation also from that 
which is tolerable and rewarding and comfortable – while it sustains and absolves 
the destructive power and repressive function of the affluent society,” (p. 7).  
 
 Imagine a healthy cell of the human body; it is serving its function of sustaining the 
body’s normal functions, laboring through debris and toxins in order to maintain the ultimate 
goal of sustaining the body. As this particular cell begins to enlarge, its organelles separate and 
replicate its purpose and functionality in a matter of seconds. Moments later, the cell cleaves and 
its innards are appropriating to their assigned positions until one cell separates itself from the 
other. Ultimately, one cell will die but its premise for existence prevails in the essence of its 
offspring, which may encounter different scenarios and adjust accordingly. Similarly, the same 
argument for the process of mitosis can serve macroscopically to the behavior of the individual 
and their role within society. The presence of each individual in a capitalist society is apparently 
classless and identical in desires and needs, through which their raison d'être is to serve the 
ultimate function of sustaining the existence of society and assimilate to change.  
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“The government of advanced and advancing industrial societies can maintain and 
secure itself only when it succeeds in mobilizing, organizing, and exploiting the 
technical, scientific, and mechanical productivity available to industrial 
civilizations. And this productivity mobilizes society as a whole, above and 
beyond any particular individual or group interests,” (Marcuse, 1964, p. 3).  
 
Through absolving the perception of class differences and emphasizing a perceived 
“sameness” of individuals in technologically-advanced and advancing industrial societies, 
assimilation to one common denominator has become the prioritized goal. This idea of faux 
“equalization of class distinctions” (p. 8) serves a competitive function in which the needs and 
satisfactions of the underlying population are shared via preservation of the Establishment 
(Marcuse, 1964), or dominating class. In turn, this perceptual sameness transposes the self by 
externalizing the Ego and internalizing a generic identity, which is reinforced by observation and 
immediate, automatic identification with the object world. However, cultural classifications 
prove to be purposeful because it defines a certain reality which affects the group’s thoughts and 
behaviors. Therefore, the entirety of subservient human behavior and alienation is mimetically 
reinforced through obligation; the individual’s desires and identity appear to be one within the 
individual and between their (proximal and metaphorical) neighbors. 
As exclusive goods become available to more social classes, their existence becomes a 
means for a better quality of life. One-dimensional thought thrives in the industrially advanced, 
capitalist mindset because it “… is systematically promoted by the makers of politics and their 
purveyors of mass information,” (Marcuse, 1964, p. 14). As the quality of life appears to 
improve by the aggregation of exclusive goods, the behavior of materialistic individuals reduces 
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to “ideas, aspirations, and objectives [that]… are redefined by the rationality of the given system 
and of its quantitative extension,” (Marcuse, 1964, p. 12, brackets added). Evidentiary influence 
in the forms of propaganda, weaponry, art, music, television, films, and advertising provided by 
the media are powerful tools which reinforce the efficacy of control over the individual; a 
demonstration of power which continuously reproduces higher expectations for human behavior 
and status quo by supplying choices through imposition. 
The concept of American liberty is counterintuitive by which its practices make a 
powerful instrument in domination (Marcuse, 1964) and sustaining alienation. By 
acknowledging that American democracy provides liberties, it also emphasizes negations 
regarding individual unfreedom, or restrictions to human freedom. Social controls make 
necessities out of deceptive liberties through what has been optioned to the individual. More 
specifically, freedoms of competition, speech, and choice represent degrees of human freedom; 
that is, what choices are given to individuals (what can be chosen) and what is chosen from these 
options by the individual (Marcuse, 1964). 
Ironically, Marxian theories of the laboring class are applicable to the practice of 
capitalism; however, Americans desire to be drastically separate from communism because 
American Exceptionalism represents qualitative differentiation from communism. During the 
Cold War, the political war between two superpowers targeted each other as the great enemy; so 
to admit that the ends of human and instrument productivity to both political means are material 
goods would be perceived as illogical and dogmatically self-destructive. Furthermore, the 
cohesion of a nation’s citizens are astronomically boosted when, “It is a cohesion on materialistic 
grounds; mobilization against the enemy works as a mighty stimulus of production and 
employment, thus sustaining the high standard of living,” (Marcuse, 1964, p. 21). Individuals are 
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viewed as instruments with limitless depths of productivity with rigid standards of possibility; 
compliance inhibits their potential to perceive alternative modes of true satisfaction, instead 
encouraging materialism and competition. Thus, the standard of living correlates with the 
amount of human productivity, separatism from the “other” and social alienation from each 
other.  
With continuous refinement and increased production speed, technology has incorporated 
its utility within the private sphere of the individual, whom slowly sacrifices privacy until it is 
virtually nonexistent. For this practice to survive and cohesion as a medium of control prevail, a 
change in the technical structure itself (Marcuse, 1964) must universally engulf privacy within 
publicity. This change would prompt that the subservient class is conditionally alienated from 
individuality and internalize productivity as a matter of survival and quantitative change. 
Productivity as a means of survival is presupposed as logical to survival with an expanding 
population, a majority of which comprise the laboring class, and a rapidly disappearing middle 
class. The acquisition of objects and materials is gluttonous by which an individual will never 
find total satisfaction in their quantity, and thus never reach actualization of their self-worth. 
Their self-worth in turn is an end to their laborious means, which encourage objects as 
necessities to survival in lieu of existing as leisurely goods.  
A promising lifestyle of comfort for those unable to imagine alternatives and a “capacity 
to contain and manipulate subversive imagination and effort,” (Marcuse, 1964, p. 23) maintains 
the lubrication of mechanical productivity. However, is the price of overexertion of the laboring 
class worth the ends of a never-ending desire for objects? Michel Foucault’s dissection of the 
origins, adjustment, and allocation of penalizing the body in Discipline and Punish (1975) 
emphasizes the process of appropriating penalty upon the deviant and insane. The dominant class 
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reinforces their power of cohesion by corralling bodies to fulfill expectations of their behavior 
and punishing outliers either physically, psychologically, economically, or any combination of 
the three methods. Punishment has likewise transitioned from translating a committed crime with 
the severity of physical pain, to utilizing the body as a means of reform, where the individual is 
the embodiment of punishment. Therefore, the consequences of nonconformity yield 
participation in an artistic refinement of punishment, which has changed alongside the technical 
structure of an industrially advanced society. 
 
“The names of things are not only ‘indicative of their manner of functioning,’ but 
their actual manner of functioning also defines and ‘closes’ the meaning of the 
thing, excluding other manners of functioning,” (Marcuse, 1964, p. 87).  
 
Rationality is constructed to define what a concept is as well as what it is not, implying 
that what is rational is also factual and cannot be repudiated. Marcuse’s concept of rationality is 
jointly associated with advancements in technology, which serves as a cohesion of power and 
social control for the general population where individuals and nature are viewed strictly as 
objects, or means to an end (overproductivity and goods). Reality, as it pertains to industrially-
advanced nations, is implicitly interwoven with technology in a way that individuals may 
perceive objects, experiences, and even themselves solely in present-tense. Under such 
circumstances of existing in an object-world, both individual and machine are viewed as 
malleable, alienated, and willing instruments. Individuals, like machines, are given 
predetermined possibilities (a technical raison d'être) which inhibit their abilities to perform in 
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an alternative fashion and are thusly equivalent to their worth among each other and against 
technological commodity. 
 Linguistics in a technologically-advanced society is functional in that its structure may 
absolve abstract thinking and repel conflicting interpretations in order to dismiss historical 
reference and eliminate challenge. Two-dimensional thought incorporates actuality with 
appearance; an opposition of dimensions where abstract, critical thinking (Marcuse, 1964, p. 97) 
exists in reality and contradiction. Dialectical language, Marcuse (1964) argues, contains 
elements of both reality and history; in its absence, a suppression of history is politically 
motivated to distort language and its content. By successfully accomplishing a stunted 
vocabulary of context and discourse, the purpose of anti-dialectical language (p. 97) serves to 
direct and control the general population to live and exist in the present (Marcuse, 1964).  
Furthermore, an abridgment of opposing concepts that would previously signal contradiction, 
now elicits truth in its falsification. The logical purposes for erasing the past eliminate future 
self-destruction: “Remembrance of the past may give rise to dangerous insights, and the 
established society,” (Marcuse, 1964, p. 98) may become disenchanted from an associative 
power that promises a better (materialistic) way of life. 
As anti-dialectical language relates to the theme of the seven editions of the DSM and the 
opening quote (p. 15) within the first edition of the DSM (DSM-I; APA, 1952), a special focus of 
consideration should consider the nomenclature utilized in describing human personality traits 
and their alleged disorders. An individual’s personality as a whole is socialized and internalized; 
the wide range of observed personality traits and the manner from which they are formed are 
based upon societal interactions and the dominating class’ expectations of what is considered 
acceptable behavior. Personality traits exist within every individual; it is what shapes the 
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perception of experiences, the ability to relate and contemplate the existence of the environment 
and the self. The expectations from the dominant class, as it pertains to the laboring class’ 
interactions with one another, insist that criteria accepted as fact sustains the subservient class as 
“rational to an unprecedented degree,” (Marcuse, 1964, p. 84). In developing a system of 
linguistic control that confines an individual’s ability to develop abstract interpretations, anti-
dialectical language limits their very ability to communicate and develop an abstract 
imagination, or higher thought. Consequentially, the laboring class’ ability to oppose and 
consider alternative measures remains incredibly limited, if nonexistent. 
The “Big Five” and its Contradictory Continuum 
 Human behavior has undergone decades of research and experimentation, with the 
primary goal to understand the expression of observable actions, with contributions made by 
possible by federal funding. In 1961, two U.S. Air Force researchers by the names of Tupes and 
Christal (1961/1992) began to examine common language (i.e. American English) in order to 
produce a comprehensive set of personality traits (McCrae & Costa, 2005). Utilizing a set of 16 
proposed personality factors (Sixteen Personality Factor Questionnaire; Cattell, 1946) (e.g. 
warmth, reasoning, dominance, and liveliness) first described by Cattell in 1946 (see McCrae & 
Costa, 2005), Tupes and Christal (1961/1992) condensed a model of five observable factors 
taken from several samples. In turn, those findings were replicated by Norman (1963) and 
described as “an adequate taxonomy of personality traits,” (McCrae & Costa, 2005, p. 35). 
However, research in personality factors would not be revived until Goldberg (1981; see McCrae 
& Costa, 2005) analyzed the origin of personality trait synonyms in order to apply them to his 
own research, thereby replicating the Five-Factor Model (FFM) of human disposition (McCrae 
& Costa, 2005).  
20 
 
McCrae and Costa (2005) describe traits and a method for observation as, "[…] 
generalized dispositions, so [we know] we must look for evidence of consistent patterns of 
behavior or reactions across a range of situations," (p. 37, brackets added). The patterns of 
behaviors or reactions that produced consistent results ultimately comprised the elements of the 
Neuroticism, Extraversion, and Openness (to experience) Personality Inventory (NEO-PI; 
McCrae & Costa, 1985) and its revised version, which contains Agreeableness and 
Conscientiousness (NEO-PI-R; McCrae & Costa, 1992). The NEO-PI-R (McCrae & Costa, 
1992) is a survey consisting of 240 items adapted for self-administration or observational 
evaluation, and the purpose of this inventory is to categorize behavior by attributing a numerical 
value (between 1-5) to associate with a characteristic (McCrae & Costa, 2005). Furthermore, 
contained within each domain is a subset of six scales, or facets, that specifically measure the 
overall concept of its given domain.  
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The "Big Five" – Five-Factor Model (FFM) of Personality 
Domain Facets Constituents 
Openness (to experience) 
Artistic Insightful Wide range of interests, 
Introspective, Unusual thought 
processes, Values intellectual 
matters, Judges in 
unconventional terms, 
Aesthetically reactive. 
Curious Original 
Imaginative Wide interests 
Conscientiousness 
Efficient Reliable Dependable/responsible, 
Productive, Able to delay 
gratification, 
Not self-indulgent, Behaves 
ethically, Has high aspiration level. 
Organized Responsible 
Planful Thorough 
Extraversion 
Active Enthusiastic Talkative, Skilled in play/humor, 
Rapid personal tempo, 
Gregarious, Facially/gesturally 
expressive. 
Assertive Outgoing 
Energetic Talkative 
Agreeableness 
Appreciative Kind Not critical/skeptical, Behaves in 
giving way, Arouses liking, 
Warm/compassionate, 
Sympathetic/considerate, Basically 
trustful. 
Forgiving Sympathetic 
Generous Trusting 
Neuroticism 
Anxious Touchy Thin-skinned, Brittle ego defenses, 
Self-defeating, Basically 
anxious, Concerned with 
adequacy, Fluctuating moods. 
Self-pitying Unstable 
Tense Worrying 
Table 2.1, The Five-Factor Model (FFM) of human personality, adapted from McCrae & John 
(1992, p. 178-179). 
 As shown above in Table 1.1, the FFM consists of Openness to experience, 
Conscientiousness, Extraversion, Agreeableness, and Neuroticism. The above table also lists the 
six facets associated with each domain and its constituents, or elements that conceptualize and 
differentiate one factor from the others. Further elaboration of each domain’s contradictory 
continuum and factors will be achieved in the following table (Table 2.2), but for now, each 
domain will be explained as it is described by McCrae and Costa (2005). Openness to experience 
refers to a “receptiveness to new ideas, approaches, and experiences,” (McCrae & Costa, 2005, 
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p. 46). Neuroticism refers to an individual’s proneness “to experience unpleasant and disturbing 
emotions” and for their actions to correspond to their emotions (McCrae & Costa, 2005, p. 46). 
Extraversion represents “differences in preference for social interaction and lively activity” 
(McCrae & Costa, 2005, p. 46). Agreeableness represents a “selfless concern for others and in 
trusting and generous sentiments” (McCrae & Costa, 2005, p. 46). Lastly, Conscientiousness 
represents a “dimension of individual differences in organization and achievement,” (McCrae & 
Costa, 2005, p. 46).  
Named categories elicit emotions and motives; they can elicit a call to action for service 
to the country, or to endure exhaustive hours of labor in order to maintain the functioning of the 
system during a time of economic dependence. Marcuse (1964) argues, “It is the word that 
orders and organizes, that induces people to do, to buy, and to accept,” (p. 86). Inasmuch the 
very limited nouns and concepts restricts the subservient population’s ability to formulate 
meaning (“habits of thought”; Marcuse, 1964, p. 85), it also stunts their ability to communicate 
and furthermore, interact. The functionality of words and concepts in the current capitalist, 
industrially-advanced society are the product of the system itself; that is, their concepts are 
operationalized through science and technology (Marcuse, 1964) to accommodate the 
elimination of privacy and autonomous dependence. Thus, by rigidly structuring concepts to fit 
observed behaviors, the subservient population’s interactions, beliefs, and attitudes can be 
standardized; traits that do not adhere to standardized preconceptions of behavior are therefore 
seen as disordered in its formation and execution. 
Marcuse’s (1964) analysis of dialectical thought and behavior utilizes the perspective of 
what is socially normal, as well as its cohesion with contradictions along a lexical continuum. 
More specifically, by adjoining opposing nouns and adjectives to describe behavior and 
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observable concepts to the current American English language resembles Orwellian (1949) 
Newspeak. When it is possible to classify behaviors by justifying what it is not (i.e., not healthy, 
not desirable), the cohesion of control to unify opposites exhibits them as one in the same, which 
validates its truth and eliminates cognitive ambiguity. As Marcuse (1964) remarks, “The syntax 
of abridgement proclaims the reconciliation of opposites by welding them together in a firm and 
familiar structure,” (p. 89). Therefore, by placing opposing concepts along the same continuum, 
the structure of current “Newspeak” conditions the human mind to perceive and function along 
such a rationale of behavior.  
The Five-Factor Model -- Human Personality Continuum 
Domain Continuum 
Openness (to experience) 
Down-to-earth -- Imaginative Prefer routine -- Prefer variety 
Uncreative -- Creative Uncurious -- Curious 
Conventional -- Original Conservative -- Liberal 
Conscientiousness 
Negligent -- Conscientious Aimless -- Ambitious 
Lazy -- Hardworking Quitting -- Persevering 
Late -- Punctual Disorganized -- Well-organized 
Extraversion 
Reserved -- Affectionate Passive -- Active 
Loner -- Joiner Sober -- Fun-loving 
Quiet -- Talkative Unfeeling -- Passionate 
Agreeableness 
Ruthless -- Softhearted Antagonistic -- Acquiescent 
Suspicious -- Trusting Critical -- Lenient 
Stingy -- Generous Irritable -- Good-natured 
Neuroticism 
Calm -- Worrying Comfortable -- Self-conscious 
Even-tempered -- Temperamental Unemotional -- Emotional 
Self-satisfied -- self-pitying Hardy -- Vulnerable 
Table 2.2, The Five Factor Model (Human Personality Continuum), adapted from McCrae & 
Costa (2005, p. 4; 1986). 
 As shown above in Table 1.2, the Five-Factor Model (FFM) of human behavior 
exemplifies the current argument that the human personality spectrum is located along a 
continuum of contradictions. As it relates to Orwellian conception of Newspeak, combining 
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nouns and adjectives that are otherwise oppositional unifies a concept’s meaningfulness within 
the individual mind and cuts off circulation to creativity. Albeit their attributes are supposed to 
range in strength of presence, each factor’s continuum are ultimately dichotomous in nature and 
represent a scale of characteristics that are weighed as either “desirable” or “not desirable”, 
“healthy” or “not healthy”. Through repetition of such conditioned behaviors, the individual 
creates a fixed image of a prototypical being, a status quo of identification adjoined with false 
familiarity.  
 The subservient class is expected to associate and abide by its given contradictions, as 
they are delivered as facts and rationality. By fusing contradictions along a continuum, repetition 
creates a sense of familiarity which lacks true understanding or application of its meaning. 
Furthermore, an association with social ideals structures a fixated representation which 
assimilates to context, and perpetuates a sense of timelessness and static presence all at once. As 
it relates to behavior and personality, a trait along a continuum encourages prototypical 
compliance, continues the social need for common identification, and validates the cohesion of 
power within adjoining contradictions. When a behavior fails to coincide with normalcy, the 
function, physical features, and habits of the individual or a group of individuals, “…leaves no 
space for distinction, development, differentiation of meaning; it moves and lives only as a 
whole,” (Marcuse, 1964, p. 93). Therefore, a collection of negative attributes creates a monstrous 
entity of fear and an overemphasized negation from normalcy. Thus, a scaffold is erected; what 
is seen as “not desirable” and “not healthy” is the ultimate fear, and results in an alienation from 
the master as well as the subservient. 
  According to Widiger (2003), “All of the fundamental symptomatology of the personality 
disorders can be understood as maladaptive variants of personality traits evident within the 
25 
 
normal population,” (p. 132). In the first and second editions of the DSM (APA, 1952 & 1968), 
personality disorders are categorized in the same axis as clinical disorders. However, personality 
disorders first appear in the third edition of the DSM (DSM-III, APA, 1980) within a separate 
axis7 in large response to “accumulating evidence that the quality and quantity of preexisting 
personality disturbance may influence the predisposition, manifestation, course, and response to 
treatment of various Axis I conditions,” (Frances, 1980; see Widiger, 2003, p. 131). In more 
recent editions of the DSM (APA; DSM-IV, 1994; DSM-IV-TR, 2000; & DSM-V, 2013) mental 
retardation (also called intellectual disabilities) is in the same axis as personality disorders, 
which one may infer shares relatedness to maladaptive personalities. Assumedly, dysfunctions in 
behavior and disabilities of intellect may be attributed to (or contribute to) the prevalence of 
clinical disorders such as (but not limited to) depression, anxiety, delirium, and obsessive-
compulsive disorder (OCD).  
Deviations from normal personality that may disrupt the structured, rational behavior of 
the general population are viewed as dysfunctional, and its constituents are contextually-based 
and readjusted as shared beliefs qualitatively shift. As elaborated by the second edition of the 
DSM, personality disorders are biologically characterized as “deeply ingrained maladaptive 
patterns of behavior that are perceptibly different in quality from psychotic and neurotic 
symptoms,” (DSM-II; APA, 1968). “It is only when personality traits are inflexible and 
maladaptive and cause either significant impairment in social or occupational functioning or 
subjective distress that they constitute Personality Disorders,” (DSM-III; APA, 1980). For an 
example of fluctuation on views of maladaptive traits, personality disorders classified sexual 
                                                             
7 Personality disorders (Axis II) belong to a separate category from clinical disorders (Axis I) as 
of the publication of the DSM-III (1980). 
26 
 
deviation, alcoholism, and drug dependence were viewed as dysfunctional behaviors in the 
DSM-I (Widiger, 2003)8.  
Personality traits are usually not viewed as problematic by the individual, whose 
characteristics may be assumed to be a product of interaction and refinement of the Ego. The 
DSM-IV-TR (APA, 2000) explains a personality trait as “… enduring patterns of perceiving, 
relating to, and thinking about the environment and oneself that are exhibited in a wide range of 
social and personal contexts,” (p. 686). Widiger (2003) argues, “Personality traits are integral to 
each person’s sense of self, as they include what people value, how they view themselves, and 
how they act most every day throughout much of their lives,” (p. 131). The DSM-IV (APA, 
1994) and DSM-IV-TR (APA, 2000) extend the conceptualization of personality disorders to one 
that implies a societal recognition of maladaptive behavior, not just an individual-based 
conception. Therefore, what the individual may not see as problematic or deviant can radically 
be contrasted to societal observation. Between the six-year gap in publication between the DSM-
IV and DSM-IV-TR, there are no visible adjustments made to what constitutes as a disorder of 
personality: 
“A Personality Disorder is an enduring pattern of inner experience and behavior that 
deviates markedly from the expectations of the individual's culture, is pervasive and inflexible, 
has an onset in adolescence or early adulthood, is stable over time, and leads to distress or 
impairment,” (DSM-IV; APA, 1994, p. 26). 
                                                             
8 Sexual and gender identity disorders (known as sexual deviation in DSM-I) are currently 
associated with Axis I disorders. Alcoholism and drug dependence are currently part of the 
section regarding substance-related disorders (DSM-IV; APA, 1994) 
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Axis II: Personality Disorders in the DSM-IV-TR (2000). 
 
• Paranoid Personality Disorder 
• Schizoid Personality Disorder 
• Schizotypal Personality Disorder 
 
• Antisocial Personality Disorder 
• Borderline Personality Disorder 
• Histrionic Personality Disorder 
• Narcissistic Personality Disorder 
 
• Avoidant Personality Disorder  
• Dependent Personality Disorder 
• Obsessive-Compulsive Personality Disorder 
 
• Personality Disorder Not Otherwise Specified 
 
Table 2.3, Axis II personality disorders and clusters, as listed in the Diagnostic and Statistical 
Manual of Mental Disorders, fourth edition revised (APA, 2000). 
Table 2.3 highlights the current personality disorders classified in the DSM-IV-TR 
(2000)9 and their designated clusters. According to their clusters, Clusters A, B, and C describe 
an observable characteristic in their classification, “based on descriptive similarities” (DSM-IV; 
APA, 1994, p. 629). Cluster A, which includes paranoid, schizoid, and schizotypal personality 
disorders, is often manifested as odd or eccentric behavior in individuals. Cluster B, which 
includes antisocial, borderline, histrionic, and narcissistic personality disorders, manifests itself 
as individuals often appearing “dramatic, emotional, or erratic,” (DSM-IV; APA, 1994, p. 630). 
                                                             
9 The current personality disorders listed in Axis II from the DSM-IV-TR (APA, 2000) are 
identical to the publication of classifications in the DSM-IV (APA, 1994), so either publication 
may be used.  
Cluster A 
Cluster B 
Cluster C 
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Cluster C, which includes avoidant, dependent, and obsessive-compulsive personality disorders, 
is often characterized as anxious or fearful behavior in individuals (DSM-IV; APA, 1994). 
Ironically, below the description of what each cluster entails, the DSM-IV (APA, 1994) states, 
“It should be noted that this clustering system, although useful in some research and educational 
situations, has serious limitations and has not been consistently validated,” (p. 630). 
Furthermore, co-morbidity of illnesses from different clusters may make it impossible (and 
improbable) to ascribe one personality disorder from one specific cluster to one specific 
individual. 
In conclusion of the chapter, Marcuse (1964) has laid the groundwork for explaining the 
compliance of normal behavior subliminally reinforced to the subservient population. A sense of 
satisfaction by acquiring materials insists that the concept of “false needs” replaces alternative 
routes of thinking, as well as eliminates time, both retrospective and projective, as well as 
conceptual ambiguity. By assuming that an individual’s needs and desires are one in the same, an 
individual’s needs render servitude and rationalism via control of societal institutions and their 
interests. By presuming that the subservient class shares a virtual sameness compared to each 
other, an assumption of class distinctions as nonexistent serves as a competitive function of 
preserving the federal government, or dominant class. On the other hand, the cultural 
classifications presented in the DSM act as a mode of social control for the subservient class by 
articulating maladaptive or incorrect modes of otherwise obligatory behavior and thought based 
on class and societal position. Moreover, the entirety of subservient human personality and 
behavior is said to be conceptualized within five domains: Openness to experience, 
Conscientiousness, Extraversion, Agreeableness, and Neuroticism.  
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Given the historical background covered in Chapter One and the groundwork covered in 
Chapter Two regarding critically analyzing American society, the cornerstone for social 
alienation and insanity has been set. Albeit Marcuse’s critical examination of technologically 
advanced and advancing societies offers a purpose for standardizing normal behavior, it still does 
not satisfy the social pariah of the alienated, subservient population – the abnormal. In the 
following chapter, Michel Foucault’s perspective of the abnormal in Madness and Civilization: A 
History of Insanity in the Age of Reason (1964) and The Birth of the Clinic: An Archaeology of 
Medical Perception (1963) will facilitate in further elaborating on the five domains of human 
personality traits, their contradicting disorders, as well as what insanity entails.  
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Chapter Three 
“Madness deals not so much with truth and the world, as with man and 
whatever truth about himself he is able to perceive,” (Michel Foucault, 
Madness and Civilization: A History of Insanity in the Age of Reason, 
1964, p. 27). 
 To explain the concepts of Western concern, one should begin the journey by 
excavating the premises of the past and apply its essential contingencies to current 
subjectivity. As discussed in the previous chapter, Marcuse depicts the separation of 
classes within a “classless society” to symbolize an adhesive division of labor and its 
stupefying, futile effect on fulfilling desires against the structure of false needs. Moreover, 
by promoting an ideology of generic needs and an apparent equalization of class 
distinctions, it technically generates more problems in lieu of pacifying most concerns. 
Immediate attention should be drawn to the first contradiction of error – how is it possible 
to exist in a society that is both divided by social worth and equilibrated in their 
distinctions? An obvious answer would be through heavy sedation, but not through routes 
of pharmaceutical sedation (which takes place at higher levels of a heuristic hierarchy) 
inasmuch as primarily social sedation, competition, and alienation.  
 In the current chapter, the discussion opens by providing a brief introduction to a 
new critique of social control in order to demonstrate the framework of the themes 
previously explained in the last chapter. The purpose of the following figure (Figure 
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3.1) is to visually demonstrate the malleability of human motivation based upon the  
manipulation by the dominant class and how its priorities are structured along five 
rungs, where each level cannot be triumphed without conquering the ones below it. 
After briefly discussing the lower three “levels” of achieving social control – social 
sedation, assimilation, desire and competition – it will be possible to illustrate in further 
detail the social construction and function of the mentally insane, the examining gaze, 
and their placement within society. 
 Following the discussion of the social function that encompasses alienation and 
ostracism of the mentally ill, the chapter will conclude by reviewing the contextual 
revision of abnormal behavior as it pertains to Axis II personality disorders within 
DSM-I (APA, 1952) through DSM-V (2013). Instead of elaborating first about the 
revisions present per edition of the DSM, it is with strongest confidence that providing 
an alternative, critical perspective will make it possible to defend the position of the 
current research as well as its integrity. By discussing the abnormal as it is documented 
in an American diagnostic tool towards the conclusion of this chapter, the goal is to 
first, demonstrate that American Exceptionalism is flawed; and secondly, absolute faith 
in a militaristic tool for diagnosing abnormalities is the origin for conditioning 
acceptable, normal American behavior.
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Hunter’s Hierarchy of Social Adhesion (2014) 
 
Figure 3.1, Hunter’s hierarchy of social adhesion (2014). 
 To understand the DSM in real-life circumstances as it relates to social sedation, 
it must be brought to explanation with a heuristic device. As displayed above in Figure 
3.1, a critical analysis of the hierarchy of social adhesion (Hunter, 2014) demonstrates a 
pyramidal construction of the elitist class’ solution to the irrational contradiction within 
social worth and the equalization of social distinctions. Social sedation is the 
groundwork and the adhesive of a developing society; more specifically, to equalize 
social distinctions, said distinctions have to first be created. To clarify, the above device 
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describes a purely empirical model of lower level social adhesion, an analytical contrast 
between the natural and functional, which systematically conforms to maintain seamless 
contextual synchronicity. Likewise, Figure 3.1 aims to materialize the rationale of the 
subservient class’ reality (i.e., obligatory thoughts and behaviors) by demonstrating how 
it is shaped at each rung as well as its impact on the following rungs. As a precursor first 
and foremost, the above diagram is merely an intermediate set of actions which occur 
between the time of social construction, the division of social worth, and the 
equalization of social distinctions. Moreover, the above device is utilized to critically 
analyze a possible conception of uniform behavior and its functional outliers. 
Social Sedation, Assimilation, Desire and Competition.  Before the Greeks of 
Classical history would perceive one another as nationally Greek, Greece would take 
the threat of Darius I and Xerxes’ tyrannical Persian invasion to bind Athens, Sparta, 
Megara, Corinth, and Aragon into a single force and notion. All of the conflict 
occurring between city-states appeared quite trivial against the threat of bondage by a 
larger, foreign enemy; ergo, their differences no longer appeared as flaws based on 
location (e.g., Spartan brute force, Athenian navy). However, there were a contradictive 
set of standards by ancient Greeks, who acquired many slaves as a result of war. 
However, under the presumption of a free democracy, the Greeks are fundamentally 
above the notion of bondage. However, against the massive Persian Empire, an 
Achillean rage cried out “I am Greek!” in a seismic clamor and victory was achieved in 
the early 500 B.C. era. As a product of preservation, the birth of nationalism entered the 
stage of social sedation and Greeks were unified. 
In Western society, specifically American society, it is a civilization blended 
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with hundreds of ethnicities, as its infamous nickname “The Great Melting Pot” depicts. 
For the sake of self-preservation however, a notion of Americanism first survives within 
us all, resisting tyrannical bondage. America was founded on the basis of escaping 
religious persecution, but there is a contradiction within that venture to escape 
persecution: a chance to create political and religious dominance. A chance of freedom 
to dominate is the fresh canvas to a painter’s brush; anything is possible to illustrate, 
given the proper tools are present. Cultural values encourage American citizens to 
embrace the meaning of being separate from other nations. Moreover, variables that 
adhere to customs and tradition (such as social roles, gender scripts, and racial 
stereotypes) are forever present yet contextually different to meet the demands of a 
developing landscape moving temporally forward. 
In order for the seed to sprout roots, the ground it impregnates must be able to 
sustain the seed during this fragile period of germination. The assimilation of a group 
requires that its members do not conflict and splinter, which means that eccentric 
individuality and objectivity have to be suffocated before it flickers. Marcuse’s (1964) 
postulation of one-dimensionality clearly regards the elimination of the abstract as a 
compromise of living in comfort and confidence in exchange for alternative, 
independent thinking (p. 23). Therefore, by limiting creativity within the bounds of 
utility and rationality as a whole under the guise of security, the dominant class is 
exercising power with minimal force. 
Much of what can be said for desire and competition is discussed in the previous 
chapter but in summation, it is the driving force behind maintaining lubrication within 
the malleability of the laboring class. With distractions provided by vanity (social 
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desirability) and false needs, hours of stupefying labor scaffolds the silhouetted image 
of comfort and the fear of being without.  In technologically-advanced countries, one’s 
worth is displayed by tangible items, titles, education, and physical appearance. Fear of 
the unknown is quite powerful and expends minimal energy; fear maintains that labor 
will persist in order to avoid decay of self-esteem and therefore, labor sustains pleasure. 
Furthermore, fear of the unknown, or the “other”, and its questionable implications of 
inquiry mobilize the dynamic alterations of desire and competition to persist. 
As pouring sand into a basket filled with holes is quite ludicrous in retrospect, 
the ideation of an American Exceptionalism is constantly under objectification for 
exactly this reason. Nietzsche’s nihilistic denunciation of a present and living God, civil 
rights, women’s liberation, Sartre’s illusion of an existential hell10, and the ever-
changing (yet contradictory) diagnostic materials that serve as a trajectory for stabilizing 
behavioral abnormalities only represent minimal examples in the plethora of tremors 
which represent revolt of traditional Western adherence and therefore, its rationality. 
Alienation and Ostracism. Michel Foucault’s classic analysis of the arrangement and 
social function of the insane in Madness and Civilization: A History of Insanity in the 
Age of Reason (1964) clears the smoke of disillusioned fear regarding the imagery 
associated with the dark recesses of the mind. Concurrently, Foucault’s (1964) 
arrangement and social function prove to facilitate the following description of the 
fourth level of social adhesion (Figure 3.1, p. 32) and therefore will be utilized to 
                                                             
10 In the play “No Exit” (1944), Jean-Paul Sartre demonstrates an alternative perspective 
of hell -- a customizable eternal suffering contoured to the individual’s fears and their 
ultimate demise. 
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demonstrate its practicality. 
 
“To inhabit the reaches long since abandoned by the lepers, they chose a 
group that to our eyes is strangely mixed and confused,” (Foucault, 1964, 
p. 45). 
 
Prior to the alienation of the insane during the Classical period (which Foucault 
regards as the period between 1660 and the end of the 19th century), leprosy was the 
scapegoat of the largest social fear and religious sacrifice. Lepers were collected from 
their village and driven to colonies located on the outskirts of the perimeter, where their 
lives would only remain in the company of the like until their deteriorative demise. 
Their infliction is both the largest social fear and religious sacrifice because it is a direct 
form of lifelong suffering by reason of moral evil’s flaw and fault. Therefore, to assist 
the leper is to alleviate the load of their mortal suffering of all men – a direct sin against 
a monotheistic God, which threatens the survival of man.  As it relates to the hierarchy, 
fear is associated with religion to eliminate contestation of the unknown, or from feeling 
sympathy towards the outcast, out of a stronger innate drive of self-preservation and 
social responsibility. 
 
“He did not come from the solid land, with its solid cities; but indeed from 
the ceaseless unrest of the sea, from those unknown highways which 
conceal so much strange knowledge, from that fantastic plain, the 
underside of the world,” (Foucault, 1964, p. 12).  
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Foucault describes a “ship of fools” (e.g. Narrenschiff; p. 8) during the late 
1600s through the eighteenth century which collected and housed the village’s insane 
and then cast them off to meander the seas and foreign lands. A league of abandoned 
cargo, unaware of their own being and void of reason and contribution, is cast to eternal 
drifting as a symbol of what could become of man. In this way, the crew of the ships 
could be within tangible sight – an ever-present threat – while remaining at a distance. 
Their lifestyle and behavior became the distinction of alien; identical to their land 
dwellers, yet alien in what represents truth and rationality. The identification of a leper 
was visually obvious, whereas the identification of the insane became a struggle, and the 
biggest fear, in and of itself. The struggle to differentiate the difference between man of 
moral and rational merit and their mentally defective, unrational neighbor became a fear 
of identification because the distinction worthy of ostracism was not immediately and 
physically present during the transition of taboo. Moreover, this transition from physical 
to spiritual, and eventually psychological, flaw and fault rejects past distinctions in 
exchange for an affliction that may possess anyone without discrimination or 
presumption. 
An intriguing transition of placement (and therefore function) of the social pariah 
takes place during the Classical period -- a migration to the center. The fear associated 
with the leper penetrated the physical and spiritual gambit while it simultaneously dulled 
the edge of mercy within individuals and society. The association with leprosy means a 
sentence of lifelong alienation; leprosy represents a diseased body. The leper’s function 
within society remains along the outskirts, an outlier in the construction of social 
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adhesion, but as its presence declined so did the underlying fear. Furthermore, the 
Renaissance signaled a birth of sophistication not previously acquired by society -- a 
cultural progression where death no longer perpetually loomed ominous concern, so it 
likewise must become a covert concept and concern. 
The folly of the madman was paramount in tales and fables as he represented the 
realization of the ever-present concept of death and apocalypse. Prior to the 
Renaissance, insanity served a purposeful function within society; as Foucault (1964) 
describes, “Madness is the great tromp l’oeil in the tragic structures of preclassical 
literature,” (p. 34). In regards to the underlying message detailed through folly, the 
madman knew the unavoidable, ominous truth of innate darkness and demise. However, 
only through illusory could the truth be accepted while contextual reality is regarded as 
“a new madness that had just come into [man’s] head,” (Foucault, 1964, p. 31-32, 
brackets added).  The cultural development of thought that followed the Renaissance 
demonstrates a deviation from ominous death and survival; folly was abandoned and the 
madman directly represented death and the darkness of man. As a result, the impugned 
madman begins to take over center stage but cannot replace the leper, so it must 
supersede the leper as social concerns shift; therefore, the function of death and the 
bestial demise within man and society must coincide with placement, ergo 
centralization.  
This centralization of the spectacle of insanity serves more than one function: 
immediacy of fear, dehumanization (discussed later), and a physical representation in 
relation to the human anatomy. The latter is quite philosophical in its explanation and 
differentiation, but it should be introduced firstly to demonstrate the comparison of the 
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human body to totem. In short, the situation of mortal fault and ailment is located 
accordingly to its anatomy, physically and geographically; moreover, the effectiveness 
of analogy demands parallel contingencies that are likewise perpendicular (the 
importance of nature, which Foucault describes as orderliness). Foucault explains that 
“He [the madman] is put in the interior of the exterior, and inversely,” (1964, p. 10, 
brackets added); or more specifically, the individuals who are believed to be mad are 
made spectacles within the public’s protected interior. A leper is visually identifiable by 
their symptoms of a diseased body, which cannot be tamed or controlled; moreover, the 
layout of the village placed the lepers along the perimeter, or the exterior.  
Concurrently, the attempts to alienate the madman from society originally 
underwent a similar process until the differentiation between madness and unrationality 
demonstrated that dominance via policing can tame madness. The inflammatory 
organization of words and imagery (i.e., “ship of fools”) along with the success of 
taming insanity’s bestial behavior, repurpose curious fear into social utility (Foucault, 
1964); thus, the placement of the madman migrates to the center of villages, towns, and 
cities. The madman, whose inflictions wary from within, make him perceivably different 
from all others by his innate essence of being – from his core. Therefore, inasmuch as 
there is a need for the insane to effectively replace the leper, the need for proximal 
relocation is just as important. In essence, madness surrounds society and engulfs it in 
fearful curiosity because the madness of man could be tamed for utility and observation. 
Ergo, demonstrating the strength of nature11 and authority of rational man in the face of 
                                                             
11 Nature, as it is regarded by Foucault (1964), is understood to encompass order and 
rationality – which appears quite contradictory to chaotic unruliness that results in an 
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perceived threat is quite a powerful tool of security. 
 Madness is feared because it threatened the preservation of life and contested 
rationality; it is a reminder of the Dark Ages, which functions as moral detest for the 
past and the greatest cultural coagulant towards progression. Furthermore, the seismic 
transition from concern about diseased bodies to a diseased mind reveals the changing 
dynamics of social consciousness, culture, and the importance of normal behavior. 
 
The Construction and Transition of Madness 
“There must have formed, silently and doubtless over the course of 
many years, a social sensibility, common to European culture, that 
suddenly began to manifest itself in the second half of the 
seventeenth century; it was this sensibility that suddenly isolated 
the category destined to populate the places of confinement,” 
(Foucault, 1964, p. 45). 
 
The underpinnings of Marcuse’s (1964) analysis of dimensionality align quite 
well with Foucault’s (1964) analyses of the economic utility of idle bodies. To be 
specific, idleness is “the mother of all evils,” (Foucault, 1964, p. 53) – it is the inability 
to follow civil law and abide by what is accepted to be sacred by the majority of 
society. Marcuse explains the overall utility of competitively laboring, malleable bodies 
that lubricate the gears of productivity and persist the social importance of a prosperous 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
absence of human intervention. However, society depicts nature as orderly and rational; a 
direct contribution of human intervention and social consciousness for self-preservation. 
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work ethic. Self-worth is associated with the moral obligation of employment and those 
individuals who appear incapable of absorbing that responsibility are labeled as social 
deviants. Foucault (1964) posits that the notion of confinement begins in the mid-17th 
century as an economic solution to the problem of idle bodies; confinement forces 
productivity and prosperous contribution by those who would otherwise refute moral 
obligation while reducing labor costs. Idleness becomes of specific social concern 
during the Classical period due to the imperative nature behind economic growth and 
sophistication, and it is here where the concept of productivity and power becomes the 
great social bond towards advancement. 
The Classical period is a time in which society aims to define the contingencies 
and existence of normalcy while attempting to separate those viewed as abnormal. It is 
possible to parallel Marcuse’s (1964) and Foucault’s (1964) perspectives of 
incongruence with social expectations and its consequences with the abstract thinking of 
the social deviants who apparently contest the myopic choices given to them. A more 
likely possibility is that their position and function within society is resituated based on 
the context of social importance and concern. “To inhabit the reaches long since 
abandoned by the lepers,” Foucault remarks, “they chose a group that to our eyes is 
strangely mixed and confused,” (1964, p. 45). Under the façade of the Hospital General, 
which “had nothing to do with any medical concept,12” (p. 40), the first established 
workhouse in France was associated with a condemnation of idle behavior in lieu of 
                                                             
12 Foucault continues that the Hospital General “…was an instance of order, of the 
monarchical and bourgeois order being organized in France during [the Classical] 
period,” (Foucault, 1964, p. 40, brackets added). 
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ailing “all contagious invalids,” (p. 44). Instead, the individuals who would find 
themselves under the thumb of authoritarian constraint were the unemployed, the poor, 
libertines, and the mad.  
Handling civil disobedience became a problem of the city during the Classical 
period, and their solution became confinement. Confinement, under the rouse of a 
medical facility, held “economic significance” (p. 50) by forcing civil law upon those 
who would not accept it. In these workhouses, the beast-like quality of madness is 
policed to instill a notion of morality and religious abidance while concealing the city’s 
shame into a single infrastructure. By creating a “safe haven” to house the mad (amongst 
other social deviants), society is able to standardize the constituents of “normalcy” 
through what it is not. The question then becomes, how did the city’s shame become 
associated with the mad? The function of the madman shifts from one of utility in folly 
to deviance and fear; confinement becomes an establishment to which the desire for 
control, the construction of concrete borders for normative behavior, and an 
exemplification of elitist control becomes paramount in the awakening of a new age of 
sophistication. 
The Dehumanizing “Gaze”. The notion of confinement is related to a refinement of 
technologies, taxation, and a stabilized government. By registering a city’s inhabitants, 
the elitist class has an accessible route within privacy and a commodity of power by 
exclusion. Likewise, the ability to confine a population of ostracized individuals reflects 
an expanding population, an expanding army and an overall societal vanity. The 
contradiction to highlight within this assumption is what Foucault (1964) defines as a 
“madness of vain presumption” (p. 29), which infects all men. If this specific sector of 
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madness is “… a delusive attachment that enables him to grant himself all the qualities, 
all the virtues or powers he lacks,” (Foucault, 1964, p. 29), how then, is the “normal” 
population of society any different than the madman who is caged? At first glance, it 
would appear impossible to confine an entire society but upon closer inspection, it is 
already enacted. By defining one group’s stereotypes and perceived inadequacies, it 
indeed isolates the “other” through constriction and vanity.  
 
“Madness had become a thing to look at: no longer a monster inside 
oneself, but an animal with strange mechanisms, a bestiality from 
which man had long since suppressed,” (Foucault, 1964, p. 70). 
 
 The fascination with the madman during the Classical period concerned the 
resilience and tolerance to what destroyed established men; the madman’s animalistic 
qualities supersede his own humanity, therefore making the possibility of perceiving the 
madman as a beast justifiable. Confinement hid most scandals, but it “explicitly drew 
attention to madness, pointed to it,” (p. 70); this spectacle of organizing madmen within 
the facility of the workhouse made it possible to perform public exhibitions. However, 
by utilizing public exhibition as a spectacle, it defined and controlled not only the social 
sphere of the madman, but that of its observers. The scandal behind confining and 
displaying the mad to the public sparks curiosity; to see the fragile line between nature 
and the ultimate human demise is frightening yet seductive. In a way, the madman 
represents a fear of the past and a fear of reprimand, and curiosity embodies a drive to 
seek its derivative.  
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Madness appears to shift from a civil disobedience, to a disease of the body, and 
ultimately a disease of the mind. The solution to the contradiction of madness within 
confinement represents itself in the form of the asylum beginning at the dawn of the 
nineteenth century. The madman has absolute freedom because he does not live by the 
same laws and morals that are contextually-based and accepted by the majority of 
society; the concerns and pains of the madman are not the same as the modern man. The 
madman is an anarchist and the anti-Christ, which therefore makes him dangerous to the 
preservation of modernity and temporal progression. The period of Enlightenment 
however, encourages curiosity to seek rationality by organizing the madman to observe 
and explain that which is diseased (i.e., the mind), but it still makes the madman quasi-
invisible in its symptomology. 
A concern has to be recognized as such by examining its disruption in society 
and enforcing the control via intervention; its threat to comfort and life as it is known at 
any point in time has to be made an imperative by stating its purpose. In order to 
understand the transition from fear to curiosity and knowledge, a broader range of its 
formulation must be examined. Foucault’s (1963) publication titled The Birth of the 
Clinic: An Archaeology of Medical Perception gives way to the introduction of 
scientifically investigating madness by first unearthing the mysterious prestige of the 
medical field. The sophistication which accompanied the Classical period, along with a 
growing population and army, obsesses over the contingencies of normalcy and 
segregating that which is not. This segregation, however, occurs on numerous levels and 
the gaze of the medical practitioner initiates from within and spreads throughout. 
The “rational order of diseases” (Foucault, 1963, p. 7) is botanical in nature. The 
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anatomy of the human body is essentially transformed into a rationale of developmental 
order, and it allows the physician to communicate with the development of the disease 
without interacting with the patient. The gaze of the physician lifts the veil of the 
uncertainty behind diseases and it is the gaze that reveals the truth of order. Moreover, 
the human body becomes a means to an end in the form of manifested symptoms and 
experimentation; the patient becomes a transparent translator for that which cannot 
speak. The patient and their human qualities are therefore dissolved, much like the 
abolishment of humanity in the madman, and thus becomes a “rediscovered portrait,” (p. 
15) of a familiar ailment. 
The patient becomes secondary to the disease, but an unavoidable disturbance 
which must be tolerated and parenthesized (Foucault, 1963). The truth lies within the 
disease because it can be observed within the nature of the human body; it follows a 
path, insofar as it does not mutate, which is recognizable to the physician whereas the 
patient is not. Moreover, the patient becomes a trivial, external fact during the gaze 
which prompts to preserve their life. “The rationality of life,” Foucault remarks, “is 
identical with the rationality of that which threatens it,” (1963, p. 7). More specifically, 
the knowledge of diseases works in conjunction with the recognition of health because it 
is from one rationale that the other can be understood. It is here that the disease and 
physician share the scaffold and spectacle; it is here where diseases can be organized 
and life can be monitored.  
The Containment of Madness. The context of the word “hospital” has transitioned 
quite dramatically since the seventeen century and so has its specific population, but the 
theme of concealment is still tangible. During the Classical period, hospitals were not 
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geared towards the rehabilitation of ill patients; moreover, illness was turned away from 
admission within their guarded fortresses. The best environment for a disease to be 
controlled was within the home where it cannot perpetuate and spread, but this rationale 
is somewhat contradictory for both diseases and madness. Contradictions geared 
towards the condemnation of housing diseases, which are to be eradicated from the body 
and population, would make the relationship between the physician and their gaze a 
short-lived relationship throughout the entire span of human existence. The knowledge 
obtained through the observation of that which threatens life would be trivial and 
archaic, but that knowledge appears to be far from its truth and utility. In fact, the 
knowledge of diseases expands into numerous disciplines that claim the same purpose – 
to manage life and examine its antithesis.  
 Society maintains contextual truths as such by accepting the premises of its 
contingencies, which is dependent upon who delivers those contingencies as truths (e.g., 
expertise and wisdom). Contrary to the condemnation of institutionalizing diseases, the 
institutionalization of insanity poses to eradicate its existence among the general 
population and organizes its role within society. As previously mentioned, the scope of 
insanity within the social sphere contextually migrates from a dark secret of man, to a 
disease of the body, and ultimately a disease of the mind. Concurrently, the body of the 
madman shifts from the figure of social utility of truths (i.e. tales and fables), to civil 
disobedience (i.e., confinement), to covert force within the asylum. As the role of the 
gaze expands to an expertise of the mind, there appears to be a transition from the 
movement of humors, to a tension of nerve fibers, to ultimately a psychological 
explanation of truths (Foucault, 1964). 
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The Seven Still-Frames 
“Data from the 2001-2002 National Epidemiologic Survey on Alcohol 
and Related Conditions suggest that approximately 15% of the U.S. 
adults have at least one personality disorder,” (DSM-V; APA, 2013, p. 
646). 
DSM-I (APA, 1952) Personality Disorders 
"The Personality pattern disturbances are considered deep seated disturbances, with 
little room for regression. Personality trait disturbances and Sociopathic personality 
disturbances under stress may at times regress to a lower level of personality 
organization and function without development of psychosis," (American Psychiatric 
Association, 1952, p. 34-35). 
Personality pattern 
disturbances 
Personality 
trait 
disturbances 
Sociopathic 
personality 
disturbances 
Special symptom 
reaction 
Inadequate personality 
Emotionally 
unstable 
personality 
Antisocial reaction Learning disturbance 
Schizoid personality 
Passive-
aggressive 
personality 
Dyssocial reaction Speech disturbance 
Cyclothymic 
personality 
Compulsive 
personality Sexual deviation Enuresis 
Paranoid personality 
Personality 
trait 
disturbance, 
other 
Addiction 
(Alcoholism, Drug 
addiction) 
Somnambulism 
      Other 
Transient situational personality disorders 
"This general classification should be restricted to reactions which are more or less 
transient in character and which appear to be an acute symptom response to a situation 
without apparent underlying personality disturbance," (American Psychiatric 
Association, 1952, p. 40). 
Transient situational personality 
disturbance 
 
Adjustment reaction of childhood 
Gross stress reaction 
 
I. Habit disturbance 
Adult situational reaction 
 
II. Conduct disturbance 
Adjustment reaction of infancy 
 
III. Neurotic traits 
Adjustment reaction of late life 
 
Adjustment reaction of adolescence 
Table 3.1, Personality disorders listed in the DSM-I (APA, 1952). 
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Albeit the intended purposes of the new diagnostic manual are aimed towards 
active duty and veteran military personnel, it manages to become a sophisticated, 
sovereign gaze of the twentieth century. Trivial words such as “adequate”, “social”, and 
“stable”, which naturally hold a mundane position in the English vernacular, begin to take 
on a derogatory connotation to anyone labeled as such when they are accompanied by a 
negative prefix. The Second World War left unanswered questions regarding shared 
insanity by a nation and a backwash of its shell-shocked troops returned to their homes, 
garlanded with albatrosses. The consequences of war, however, would leave its 
impressions upon a civilization long after the extravagant pride of congregated Allied 
forces finalized sanctions. The publication of the first DSM in 1952 (American Psychiatric 
Association) marks the first consensus of Americanized sensationalism through behavioral 
reprimand, but it would surely not be the last.  
 Personality disorders, the American Psychiatric Association (1952) assumes, “… 
are characterized by developmental defects or pathological trends in the personality 
structure, with minimal subjective anxiety, and little or no sense of distress,” (p. 34). 
Specifically, at the time of publication, personality disorders are not attributed to external 
variables or one’s internal interpretation. Similar to the attribution of insanity provided by 
the family, which Foucault (1964) describes about the inspection of diseased minds, 
personality disorders are attributed to be particular to the individual and their family. The 
first group of disorders, personality pattern disorders, describes a reluctance of the 
individual’s personality to ever be altered or alleviated, with its only direction being a 
downward slope into psychosis. The second group, personality trait disturbances, 
encompasses disorders where individuals have an inability to manage their “emotional 
49 
 
equilibrium and independence under minor or major stress,” (DSM-I; APA, 1952, p. 36) 
due to an interruption during emotional development.  
Individuals classified with personality trait disturbances are diagnosed according to 
a “fixation and exaggeration of certain character and behavior patterns,” (DSM-I; APA, 
1952, p. 36) or increasingly simplify in behavior due to external (environmental) or 
internalized stress. Moreover, evidence of “physical immaturity” (p. 36) tends to 
supplement an indication of an underlying personality impediment. The third group, 
sociopathic personality disturbances, posits that individuals are unable to socialize and 
conform to “the prevailing cultural milieu” (p. 38). Unable to find comfort in their own 
skin or in relationships with others, individuals diagnosed with sociopathic personality 
disorders are perceived more often to have a high comorbidity rate with both personality 
trait and pattern disturbances. Transient situational personality disorders appear to be a 
set of diagnoses likewise known as defense mechanisms; their acute reactions are 
responsive to scenarios and “transient in character” (p. 40). Furthermore, experience to 
similar situations is a means of adapting and thus, symptoms will recede as stress declines.  
During a conversation with a trusted mentor, it became abundantly clear that this 
style of accompanying words and their observed symptoms can be aptly known as 
objectivity with a vengeance. Objectivity with a vengeance positions objectivity as 
negative by nature, but the physicians who define the contingencies of personality 
disorders observe its symptoms from a distance. In methodological research, this 
“distance” is justified as observational – where the natural discourse of events remains 
pure of influence. The physicians assume a point of view that is “neutral”, yet the 
physician never wants to know what the lived experience is in order to deviate from any 
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positive outcome. In this way, the primitive dichotomy of “healthy/not healthy” and 
“normal/abnormal” is sustained and culturally preserved over the course of more than 
sixty years within arbitrary text. Furthermore, this dichotomy is elaborated in more depth 
within the course of eighteen years, and personality disorders begin to form an entity 
separate from sexual deviancies and addictions. 
DSM-II (APA, 1968) Personality Disorders 
"This group of disorders is characterized by deeply ingrained maladaptive patterns of 
behavior that are perceptibly different in quality from psychotic and neurotic symptoms. 
Generally, these are life-long patterns, often recognizable by the time of adolescence or 
earlier." (American Psychiatric Association, 1968, p. 41).  
**"In DSM-I 'Personality Disorders' also included disorders now classified under Sexual 
deviation, Alcoholism, and Drug dependence," (American Psychiatric Association, 1968, 
p. 42) 
Paranoid personality 
Obsessive compulsive 
personality ((Anankastic 
personality)) 
Passive-aggressive 
personality 
Cyclothymic personality 
((Affective personality)) 
Hysterical personality 
(Histrionic personality 
disorder) 
Inadequate personality 
Schizoid personality Asthenic personality 
Other personality 
disorders of specified 
types (Immature 
personality ) 
Explosive personality 
(Epileptoid personality disorder) Antisocial personality 
[Unspecified 
personality disorder] 
Table 3.2, Personality disorders listed in the DSM-II (APA, 1968). 
A few notable differences exist between the first and second editions of the 
diagnostic manual, particularly the addition of new diagnoses, the elimination of clustered 
categories, as well as the relocation of sexual deviation, alcoholism, and drug dependence 
into a new classification. New diagnostic additions in the second edition include explosive 
personality disorder, hysterical/histrionic personality disorder, asthenic personality 
disorder, immature personality, and those personality disorders that cannot be specified. 
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Moreover, compulsive personality disorder tends to teeter with obsession throughout the 
history of the diagnostic manual’s existence. In the DSM-I, compulsive personality 
disorder is described as a “chronic, excessive, or obsessive concern with adherence to 
standards of conscience or of conformity,” (APA, 1952, p. 37) which renders an individual 
unable to easily relax and may be the result of behavioral patterns first introduced during 
their adolescence. By 1968, the disorder is coupled with an “obsessive” element yet 
remains contextually similar in symptomology as its predecessor. 
 
“… The idea of hysteria is a catchall for the fantasies, not of the 
person who is or believes himself ill, but of the ignorant doctor who 
pretends to know why,” (Foucault, 1964, p. 139).  
 
 Contrary to the first edition of the DSM, the second edition includes hysterical 
personality disorder, more popularly known as histrionic personality disorder. The 
symptoms, as stated by the DSM-II (APA, 1968), are characterized by “excitability, 
emotional instability, over-reactivity, and self-dramatization […] ...immature, self-
centered, often vain, and usually dependent on others,” (p. 43, brackets added). In 
Foucault’s (1964) analysis of madness, there are four core aspects of madness: mania, 
melancholy, hysteria, and hypochondriasis. The transition of attributing madness from one 
of movement of animal spirits, to a movement of humors, to nerve fiber tensions and 
ultimately a disorder of the psyche dedicated long hours to creating rationality for its 
occurrence. In specific, hysteria (which translates to “wandering uterus”) afflicted 
individuals (particularly women) with “soft bodies” (Foucault, 1964, p. 121), a condition 
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associated with idle bodies which perspire less and therefore contain toxins (i.e., heat, 
animal spirits, and humors) which must be equilibrated or expelled. As a result of the soft 
body’s exposure to excitation or trauma, it has a seismic effect upon the body and thus 
more difficult to recover, if ever.  
 Attention should also be directed towards the transience of homosexuality as a 
mental disorder, which prior to the publication of the first DSM, was religiously 
condemned as a mortal evil (i.e., sodomy) worthy of an express ticket to hell. Moreover, 
homosexuality (and sexual deviancies in general) is previously classified by physicians as 
“psychopathic personality with pathologic sexuality,” (DSM-I; APA, 1952, p. 39). By the 
time of the first publication of the DSM, homosexuality is classified as a priority sexual 
deviance under the category of sociopathic personality disturbances. In the second edition 
of the DSM, sexual deviation is separated from personality disorders and houses a set of 
diagnoses within its own identity. However, there is not a set of symptoms available to 
assist in diagnosing an individual with such a sexual deviation. Instead, the broader 
classification of sexual deviation implies that albeit the deviant behaviors are considered 
grossly bizarre by many, the individual is “unable to substitute normal sexual behavior for 
them,” (DSM-II; APA, 1968, p. 44). More specifically, by deviating from normal sexual 
behavior, one believably forfeits their gender and thus contesting culturally-based values. 
Considering the background of hysteria and homosexuality, the continued transience of 
the latter and the addition of hysterical personality disorder within the second edition of 
the DSM is thus an insult and a sexist method of preserving primitive gender scripts. 
After reviewing contextual differences between DSM-I (APA, 1952) and DSM-II 
(APA, 1968), one thing becomes abundantly clear – the word “individual” transitions to 
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“patient” within its diagnostic definitions.  By placing the individual within a set of 
parenthesis, it becomes easier to depersonalize the human being and all of their qualities 
from the disorder, in order to further distance experience from neutrality. For example, the 
sophistication of context between DSM-I and DSM-II in their description of antisocial 
personality disorder paints an image of an individual with political undertones appropriate 
to their era – dusking of WWII and McCarthyism (i.e., “Red Scare”, and Cold War). The 
imagery and context associated with fascists, communists, and Nazis has somehow been 
boiled down into behaviors that encapsulate an entire civilization and work against 
American civilians: trouble-making, callous, pleasure-seeking, selfish, and an inability to 
learn from experience or punishment. Furthermore, the depth of specificity from one 
definition to its successor reveals a normative belief structure that condemns “significant” 
deviations from standardized (or normal) behavior and its potential threat to the general 
population. 
To briefly transition before discussing the third edition of the DSM, an important 
chain of political events, followed by an equally important document, deserves to be 
brought to attention. In June of 1968, the United States experienced an uproar from the 
lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, and queer community: Stonewall riots in the 
Greenwich Village (The Leadership Conference, 2009). As a result of police officers 
harassing a few patrons attending a popular gay bar, a riot broke out and continued for 
several days after. Following the anniversary of this event, a band of gay pride parades 
occurred in several major cities, including San Francisco, and the liberation ensued. The 
voice of an oppressed group began to gain amplification, which grabbed the attention of 
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the American Psychiatric Association. Between the second and third editions of the DSM, 
the American Psychiatric Association released a statement of revision: 
Homosexuality and Sexual Orientation Disturbance: 
Proposed Change in DSM-II, 6th Printing, page 44 
302.0 Sexual orientation disturbance (Homosexuality) 
This category is for individuals whose sexual interests are directed 
primarily toward people of the same sex and who are either disturbed by, in 
conflict with, or wish to change their sexual orientation. This diagnostic category 
is distinguished from homosexuality, which by itself does not constitute a 
psychiatric disorder. Homosexuality per se is one form of sexual behavior and, 
like other forms of sexual behavior which are not by themselves psychiatric 
disorders, is not listed in this nomenclature of mental disorders. 
Figure 3.2, Opening statement for the rationale regarding a proposed change of 
homosexuality and revision of APA nomenclature for the DSM-II (Document Reference 
No. 730008; Washington, D.C.: APA, 1973). 
 Dr. Robert Spitzer, a member of the APA Task Force on Nomenclature and 
Statistics, formulates the rationale in response to rising controversy regarding 
homosexuality as a “pathological deviation of normal sexual development or as a normal 
variant of the human potential for sexual response,” (p. 1). The argument for the inverse 
is that the classification of homosexuality under any regards as a psychiatric disorder is 
“scientifically incorrect” and that it manipulates the relationship between the homosexual 
community and the discipline of psychiatry, as well as justifying non-professional denial 
of any and all civil rights. The counterarguments made by those who wish to maintain its 
discriminatory classification insist that by succumbing to the persuasion that 
homosexuals are not sick, it would discourage imperative treatment. What is critically 
paramount within this five-page document is that the American Psychiatric Association’s 
members have finally agreed upon a solid definition of what is homosexuality: 
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“Homosexuality refers to an interest in sexual relations or contact with 
members of the same sex. Some experts in our field believe that 
predominant or exclusive homosexuality is pathological; other experts 
believe it a normal variant,” (Spitzer, 1973, p. 2).  
Furthermore, the following points of agreement made by the APA insist that 
while a significant proportion of homosexuals are content with their orientation and show 
no signs of psychopathology, a significant proportion of homosexuals are in conflict with 
their orientation and desire to change it (Spitzer, 1973). Prior to the above, neither 
editions of the DSM have a definition of what homosexuality is clinically symptomized 
to be. However, by creating this definition, it has likewise given life to an entity from 
which to express condemnation, judgment, and hate. Conversely, the APA describes that 
the hate towards homosexuality is internalized by the individual who is in conflict with 
their identity and feelings in lieu of its inverse. Yet the question remains – how can an 
individual hate themselves without the cue and expectations of their cultural environment 
primarily leaning its preferences? 
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DSM-III (APA, 1980) Personality Disorders 
"It is only when personality traits are inflexible and maladaptive and cause either 
significant impairment in social or occupational functioning or subjective 
distress that they constitute Personality Disorders. The manifestations of 
Personality Disorders are generally recognizable by adolescence or earlier and 
continue throughout most of adult life, though they often become less obvious in 
middle or old age." (American Psychiatric Association, 1980, p. 305).  
**"The diagnosis of a Personality Disorder should be made only when the 
characteristic features are typical of the individual's long-term functioning and 
are not limited to discrete episodes of illness." (American Psychiatric 
Association, 1980, p. 305) 
Cluster I Cluster II Cluster III 
Paranoid Histrionic Avoidant 
Schizoid Narcissistic Dependent 
Schizotypal Antisocial Compulsive 
 Borderline Passive-aggressive  
Atypical, Mixed, or Other Personality Disorder 
"If an individual qualifies for any of the specific Personality Disorders, that 
category should be noted even if some features from other categories are 
present," (DSM-III; APA, 1980, p. 329). 
Atypical Mixed 
Other Personality Disorder 
Table 3.3a, Personality disorders listed in the DSM-III (APA, 1980). 
  The third edition of the DSM (1980), which coincides with the ICD-9-CM (WHO, 
1979)13, receives a makeover and augmentation; the third edition contains a staggering 
                                                             
13 The ICD-9-CM (WHO, 1979) is specifically intended for classifications for hospital 
coding in the United States, which appears to be somewhat incongruent with 
classifications from the ICD-9 and further supplementing the argument of a possible 
American Exceptionalism (Scientific Data Documentation; International Classification of 
Diseases-9-CM, 1979).  
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494 pages, of which 25 pages discuss personality disorders14. Concurrently, personality 
disorders are coded as Axis II disorders15 and schizotypal, narcissistic, borderline, and 
dependent personality disorders are formally introduced and replace disorders such as 
explosive and cyclothymic personality disorders. Upon further examination, there appears 
to be an interchangeable relationship between compulsive personality and obsessive-
compulsive personality disorder among the first three editions. Likewise, there is a 
refinement within the description and classification of histrionic personality disorder 
(formerly known as hysterical personality disorder and must be distinguishably different 
from hysterical neurosis).  
 During the 1960s, an investigation of the primary facets of human personality is 
investigated with the hopes of confining the abyss of human behavior within a continuum 
and its findings lend great utility for personifying personality abnormalities by route of 
clustering and external perception. The clustering of personality disorders may appear 
trivial at first, but its justification positions that each cluster possesses a specific theme: 
“‘odd’ or eccentric,” (Cluster I), “dramatic, emotional, or erratic,” (Cluster II), and 
“anxious or fearful” (Cluster III) (DSM-III; APA, 1980, p. 307). Both personality 
disorders specifically discussed below, as well as those not mentioned but present in the 
DSM-III, are making a shift from a diagnosis to a perceivable illness; the nosology of 
personality disorders are in and of themselves developing a personality. By supplementing 
                                                             
14 Table 4.1 (p. 88) in Chapter Four covers the total number of classifications, the total 
number of personality disorder classifications, and the total number of pages per version 
of the seven DSMs.  
15 In the first two editions of the DSM, the utilization of Axes did not exist. 
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symptoms with perceivable differences from normalcy (e.g., “stiff”, stubborn, indecisive, 
“princess”, femininity), it justifies nonprofessional observation and ultimately, ostracism. 
The third edition of the DSM manages to take symptomology a step further; it is apparent 
that by elaborating on a personality disorder with more specificity, it parenthesizes the 
individual (whom literally transitions to a “patient” in the second edition) and engulfs their 
entire life within a derogatory diagnosis. 
 Dramatic, emotional, erratic personalities appear to make an abrasive impact on 
others due to the individual’s perceived inability to conform to rational thinking, with 
egocentricism demanding a large part of their identity. Narcissistic personality disorder 
makes its formal introduction within the third edition of the DSM (APA, 1980) and is 
characterized as a “grandiose sense of self-importance or uniqueness,” (p. 315). 
Furthermore, narcissism is the only negative personality attribute featured in the catalogue 
of personality factors16 and it becomes the easiest of the objective traits to impugn. 
Foucault (1964) explains that the understanding behind passions is that it drives men to 
madness, but passion also directs to mastering human expression through the arts. In 
assuming this relationship of passion and madness, an element of narcissism must be 
present as an intermediate towards the drive of continued success. However, in regards to 
20th century perception of narcissism, it may appear quite irritating to others within the 
gambit of absolved social distinctions. 
Histrionic personality disorder, formerly known as hysterical personality disorder, 
remains quite gender specific – or more realistically, sexist – in its symptomology. In the 
                                                             
16 Narcissism is accompanied with openness to experience, agreeability, 
conscientiousness, and extraversion. 
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DSM-II, hysterical (histrionic) personality disorder characterizes individuals as 
emotionally instable, immature, perpetually attention-seeking and seductive, as well as 
prone to self-dramatization (APA, 1968, p. 43). By the publication of the third edition of 
the DSM, histrionic personality disorder is explained in more depth (or justified with more 
specificity), and describes patients as often assuming the role of the “victim” or “princess” 
(DSM-III; APA, 1980, p. 313). However, the most incriminating evidence relating to 
sexism lies within this sentence: “Flights into romantic fantasy are common; in both sexes 
overt behavior often is a caricature of femininity,” (DSM-III; APA, 1980, p. 314). As 
previously mentioned, there is a concrete persistence by the members of the association to 
solidify and maintain gender scripts, which likewise impugns the female sex and relates to 
the assumption of a higher prevalence for the affliction of “soft bodies” (Foucault, 1964) 
as a scientific fact.  
 The interchangeable relationship between compulsive and obsessive compulsive 
personality disorder (and within the disorder, characterized with hyphenation not present 
until the fourth edition in 1994) appears to show a conflicting set of standards and 
therefore the identity of the disorder is more inconsistent than the affected individual. In 
the first edition of the DSM, compulsive personality disorder characterizes individuals as 
suffering from a “chronic, excessive, or obsessive concern with adherence to standards of 
conscience or of conformity,” (APA, 1952, p. 27). Albeit their behavior may be 
“overinhibited, overconscientious, and may have an inordinate capacity for work,” (p. 27), 
their hyperanalytical behavior and its characterizations are not viewed as an “invariable 
consequence” (p. 27) within a product-driven society. However, in the DSM-II (1968), the 
elimination of any benefit within hypervigilant behavior is compensated by augmenting its 
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deteriorative aspects: rigidity, hyper-inhibition, hyper-conscientiousness, hyper-dutiful, 
and an inability to relax (p. 43). In the third edition of the DSM (1980), a more in depth 
description of compulsive personality disorder provides specific characteristics of the 
disorder as well as how the general population may perceive such symptoms. 
 
Table 3.3b, Disorders present in children and adolescents, and their manifestation in the 
form of a personality disorder upon maturation (DSM-III; APA, 1980, p. 305). 
 In the metaphorical black hole of categorization, it is apparent that once an 
individual’s behavior is viewed as maladaptive, it remains impossible to escape the 
parenthetical paradigm. To further justify the imperative nature of personality disorders, 
the DSM-III (1980) explains the discourse behind the manifestation of personality 
disorders, which may appear during childhood and adolescence. Above, Table 3.3b is a 
correspondence of what the DSM-III warrants as personality disorders being a lifelong 
deviation from normal behavior, by lending credibility to its predecessor during 
childhood and adolescence. More specifically, if certain features of deviance are present 
in children or adolescents, it will mature alongside the chronological maturation of the 
individual onward into adulthood. Conclusively and with all respect, the parentheses 
Passive-Aggressive Personality 
Disorder
Identity Disorder Borderline Personality Disorder
Disorders of Childhood or 
Adolescence
Personality Disorders
Schizoid Disorder of Childhood or 
Adolescence
Schizoid Personality Disorder
Avoidant Disorder of Childhood or 
Adolescence
Avoidant Personality Disorder
Conduct Disorder Antisocial Personality Disorder
Oppositional Disorder
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which engulf the patient depersonalize their human qualities and the ellipses within said 
parentheses disorient an escape route. 
DSM-III-R (APA, 1987) Personality Disorders 
"It is only when personality traits are inflexible and maladaptive and 
cause either significant functional impairment or subjective distress that 
they constitute Personality Disorders. 
 
"The manifestations of Personality Disorders are often recognizable 
by adolescence or earlier and continue throughout most of adult life, 
though they often become less obvious in middle or old age. 
The diagnostic criteria for the Personality Disorders refer to behaviors 
or traits that are characteristic of the person's recent (past year) and 
long-term functioning since early adulthood. The constellation of 
behaviors or traits causes either significant impairment in social or 
occupational functioning or subjective distress," (American Psychiatric 
Association, 1987, p. 335). 
Cluster A Cluster B Cluster C 
Paranoid Antisocial Avoidant 
Schizoid Borderline Dependent 
Schizotypal Histrionic Obsessive Compulsive 
 Narcissistic Passive aggressive  
Personality Disorder, Not Otherwise Specified (NOS) 
Table 3.4a, Personality disorders listed in the DSM-III-TR (APA, 1987).  
In 1983, the American Psychiatric Association arguably begins to revise the third 
edition of the DSM, upon the context of knowledge and understanding as a single still 
frame in time. The purposes for revision include inconsistent diagnostic in comparison to 
findings of new research, as well as unclear, inconsistent, and contradictory criteria 
between categories (APA, 1987). More importantly, the APA claims that the World 
Health Organization requests their expertise in contributing to the mental disorders chapter 
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of the ICD-10 “which is expected to go into effect around 1992,”17 (DSM-III-R; APA, 
1987, p. xvii). Therefore, in order to capture a “current still frame” (and avoid 
embarrassment via contradiction from archaic data) that will in turn reflect itself within 
the ICD-10, assemblies of “experts” organize into committees with the mission to review 
and make suggestions for the revised edition of the third DSM. 
 The following question might be, “Why is there a revised edition of the third DSM 
instead of a fourth edition of the DSM?” The DSM-III-R warrants the defense of 
coinciding with the future ICD-10; perhaps this is to strengthen its own credibility and 
practicality, while separating itself from other countries. This particular separation is 
essential to defining the competing expectations of Western science and research while 
pinpointing the derivations of American behavior. The United States, which is 
approaching the horizon of a spring equinox after a long Cold War, consequentially (or 
beneficially, depending on one’s stance) does not make the DSM universal but it does 
develop an ideation of American supremacy based on knowledge. In this way, by 
continuously redefining itself and seeking confirmation via textual conformity, the DSM 
is always a present figure living in the future tense. 
 The introduction of the DSM-III-R states that the “DSM-III was intended 
primarily for use in the United States, but it has had considerable influence 
internationally,” (APA, 1987, p. xviii). However, personality disorders remain strictly 
applicable to American standards due to differences of definably normal based on social 
expectations, as well as conflictions with religious interpretation which may translate as 
                                                             
17 The publication of the ICD-10 occurred in 1992 but the use of the ICD-10 by WHO 
Member States did not begin until 1994. 
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normal given the context. Moreover, to objectively observe and thus dictate the 
constituents of normal behavior among other sociocultural groups, given that the APA 
cannot harmoniously contend to what is normal behavior for Americans, makes the 
argument of universality invasive and moot.  
 In the revised edition of the third DSM, there are a few changes made to the Axis 
II personality disorders, most of which are philosophical in argument. The first, and most 
obvious, is the inclusion of personality disorders that are not otherwise specified. Prior to 
this diagnosis, or a lack of compliance to other diagnoses, the DSM-II (APA, 1968) is the 
last edition of the DSM to include a “catchall” section. Moreover, the DSM-III (APA, 
1980) created three categories within its catchall: atypical, mixed, and other personality 
disorders. Atypical personality disorder is assigned to individuals when the clinician 
perceives a personality disorder to be present, yet cannot decipher which disorder it may 
be. Mixed personality disorder is used for individuals who have features from several 
designated personality disorders present, yet cannot meet the criteria for any single 
diagnosis. Lastly, the classification of other personality disorder is assigned to an 
individual at the disposal of the clinician when there is a perceivable personality disorder 
present but it does not fit within a specific classification, yet deemed as appropriately 
necessary (e.g., masochistic, or  impulsive) (DSM-III; APA, 1980, p. 330). 
Similar to the passage (p. 23) by Foucault (1964, p. 139) regarding hysteria, the 
diagnosis of “not otherwise specified” is a fantasy for the physician who pretends to hold 
expertise and knowledge, not for the individual whom believes themselves to be ill. Its 
conditional diagnosis indicates that an example of the given catchall is, “features of more 
than one specific Personality Disorder that do not meet the full criteria for any one, yet 
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cause significant impairment in social or occupational functioning, or subjective 
distress,” (DSM-III-R; APA, 1987, p. 358). More or less, the three diagnoses present in 
the third edition of the DSM under atypical, mixed, and other personality disorders are 
combined into a single diagnosis in order to avoid repetition and the likelihood of 
differential diagnoses for trivial criteria requirements. After all, the DSM is only a tool to 
guide the clinician but it does not mean that there is consistency from one clinician to the 
next. 
Humans are very social creatures and their identity and behavior is assumed and 
modified based on the feedback from others. Symbolic interactionism, as pioneered by 
George Herbert Mead (1934), dictates that reality is a social development provided 
through interaction with others. Moreover, individuals do not react to objects or one 
another based on their literal position but rather through their understanding of it. Society 
and the individual cannot be separated because of its consistent interaction and 
adjustment to one another, but intermediate variables may act as deciding factors. The 
social understanding of the dichotomy of “healthy/not healthy” or “normal/not normal” is 
the underpinning of ostracism and the DSM is its intermediary. In specific, personality 
disorders act as the deciding factor between the relationship of symbolic interactionism 
and ostracism based on the social understanding of what that diagnosis represents. 
The opening section of the Axis II personality disorders for both the DSM-III 
(APA, 1980) and DSM-III-R (APA, 1987) provide three subsections within its 
introduction that push the envelope a bit further and chirp credence to the concept of 
objectivity with a vengeance: associated features, age at onset and course, and 
impairment. Associated features of personality disorders positions that individuals with a 
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personality disorder are frequently “dissatisfied with the impact his or her behavior is 
having on others or with his or her inability to function effectively,” (DSM-III-R; APA, 
1987, p. 336). In lay terms, others are dissatisfied with the behavior and their feedback is 
what creates dissonance within the individual, whom may not regard their behavior as 
undesirable or is unable to “modify them despite great effort,” (p. 336). Age at onset and 
course relates to the age of recognition of said disorders; “…Personality Disorders by 
definition generally are recognizable by adolescence or early adult life and are 
characteristic of most of adult life,” (p. 336). Impairment, which relates to the severity of 
infliction upon one’s ability, positions that “…impairment in social and occupational 
functioning” (p. 336) may be markedly present.  
In the DSM-III (1980) and DSM-III-R (1987), associated features and 
impairments accompany each disorder alongside variables such as complications, 
predisposing factors, prevalence, sex ratio, familial pattern, and differential diagnosis. 
Furthermore, based on knowledge of background and research, some disorders may 
contain more information than others. The irony becomes jam-locked within the 
repetition or ambiguity of each disorder as the whole is deconstructed into parts; a 
gestalten conundrum in which the DSM reveals its shortcomings by attempting to provide 
a strengthening argument of truth. The product of deconstructing a larger entity reveals 
less value and validity to the overall purpose of predictability, to which truths must be 
repositioned and accredited to expertise. Below, Table 3.4b exemplifies the consequences 
of accentuating the parts in lieu of the whole; the disorders present in children and 
adolescents and their manifestation into a personality disorder in adulthood is 
significantly reduced as a result of inconsistencies and contradictions: 
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Table 3.4b, Disorders present in children and adolescents, and their manifestation in the 
form of a personality disorder upon maturation (DSM-III-R; APA, 1987, p. 335). 
Lastly, Cluster C personality disorders, which encompasses personalities marked 
by anxious or fearful behavior, appears to undergo yet another cosmetic transition in 
regards to obsessive compulsive and passive aggressive personality disorder. The former 
is accompanied and slowly adjoining with an obsessive component and the latter is absent 
of an essential conjoining. Obsessive compulsive personality disorder remains essentially 
the same in some regards, but is explained in more depth when accompanied by obsession; 
the individual feels incompetent despite perfectionism and accomplishments, pervasively 
inflexible, stubborn, “stiff”, and poorly manages time given constraints. Concurrently, the 
concept of conformity is still ever present in the diagnosis yet textually eliminated from 
the primary criteria and a preoccupation towards rules and trivial details while detaining 
pleasure distracts the individual from thinking practically. Likewise, the symptomology is 
explained in regards to actions performed and thought processes in order to lean 
credibility to the diagnosis and to justify the dichotomy of “normal/not normal” by 
professionals and nonprofessionals alike.  
Passive aggressive personality disorder, on the other hand, is slowly disintegrating 
Identity Disorder Borderline Personality Disorder
Avoidant Disorder of Childhood or 
Adolescence
Avoidant Personality Disorder
Conduct Disorder Antisocial Personality Disorder
Disorders of Childhood or 
Adolescence
Personality Disorders
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by the adjoining seams as research on adolescent behavior demonstrates a diminuendo of 
the marked characteristics of passive aggressive disorder as an individual matures in age 
and experience. Furthermore, the knowledge or understanding of the disorder as a whole 
contains minimal data to support its assumptions. For example, the characteristics of 
passive aggressive disorder feature “a pervasive pattern of passive resistance to demands 
for adequate social and occupational performance… expressed indirectly rather than 
directly,” (DSM-III-R; APA, 1987, p. 356). Individuals labeled as passive aggressive are 
often defiant, critical, irritable, “argumentative when asked to do something they do not 
want to do,” (p. 357), and resentful towards facilitative information regarding 
productivity. Thus, its diagnosis assumes “such people are passively expressing covert 
aggression,” (p. 356), which is quite common among adolescents and their attitudes 
towards individuals assuming an authoritative role.  
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DSM-IV (APA, 1994) Personality Disorders 
"A Personality Disorder is an enduring pattern of inner experience and 
behavior that deviates markedly from the expectations of the individual's 
culture, is pervasive and inflexible, has an onset in adolescence or 
early adulthood, is stable over time, and leads to distress or impairment. 
Only when personality traits are inflexible and maladaptive and cause 
significant functional impairment or subjective distress do they constitute 
Personality Disorders," (American Psychiatric Association, 1994, p. 629). 
 
“A Personality Disorder should be diagnosed only when the defining 
characteristics appeared before early adulthood, are typical of the 
individual's long-term functioning, and do not occur exclusively during an 
episode of an Axis I disorder,” (American Psychiatric Association, 1994, p. 
632). 
Cluster A Cluster B Cluster C 
Paranoid Antisocial Avoidant 
Schizoid Borderline Dependent 
Schizotypal Histrionic Obsessive-Compulsive 
 Narcissistic  
Personality Disorder, Not Otherwise Specified (NOS) 
Table 3.5, Personality disorders listed in the DSM-IV (APA, 1994). 
 The publication of the fourth DSM in 1994 coincides with the release of the ICD-
10 (WHO, 1994), as projected within the introduction of the revised edition of the DSM-
III (APA, 1987). The DSM-IV aims to be facilitative across many different settings – 
“…inpatient, outpatient, partial hospital, consultation-liaison, clinic, private practice, and 
primary care, and with community populations,” (p. xv). In the hopes of “striving for 
brevity of criteria sets, clarity of language, and explicit statements of the constructs 
embodied in the diagnostic criteria,” (DSM-IV; APA, 1994, p. xv) it implicitly made 
digestibility of otherwise intricate concepts easier to comprehend among the general 
population. It is questionable, however, to rely so heavily on the congregational 
brainstorming of thirteen work groups each comprised of approximately five experts 
whose reports were “critiqued by between 50 and 100 advisers, who were also chosen to 
69 
 
represent diverse clinical and research expertise, disciplines, backgrounds, and settings,” 
(p. xv). Despite the critique by many advisers, it is still perfunctory as the limits of the 
critique are associated with the breadth and detail given within the reviews. 
 Once again, personality disorders are characterized as an enduring pattern of 
maladaptive behavior which definitively deviates from the norms of their culture and 
social expectations. Moreover, personality disorders are to be diagnosed by an “objective” 
outsider, which can be anyone with a basic knowledge of the DSM and a certification 
degree. According to the preemptive considerations, a diagnosis is sometimes sufficed 
through a single interview18, yet more are encouraged in order to decipher what is ego-
syntonic19, age appropriate (e.g., young adulthood), attributable to sudden loss, or not 
associated with complications as the result assimilation given that the “individual’s ethnic, 
cultural, and social background” (DSM-IV; APA, 1994, p. 631) is one of immigrant 
status. Considering the supposed neutrality of the expert, the wisdom inscribed within the 
DSM-IV (APA, 1994) also supplements that personality disorders are often gender-
specific in prevalence; antisocial personality disorder being more often diagnosed in men 
while borderline, histrionic, and dependent personality disorder are diagnosed more often 
in women (DSM-IV; APA, 1994, p. 631-632). Given that the designation of personality 
disorder prevalence is related to one’s gender (i.e., men or women) in lieu of sex (i.e., 
male, female), it is possible to assume that said maladaptive behaviors are attributed to 
                                                             
18 The DSM-IV also suggests that several interviews should be conducted and spaced out 
over time (APA, 1994, p. 630).  
19 Ego-syntonic refers to the individual perceiving their personality or its characteristics 
as unproblematic (DSM-IV; APA, 1994, p. 631).  
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social stereotypes related to scripts and roles of both genders and are not in fact 
biological20.  
 It is during this time that interviews become imperative to assessment more so to 
acquire solid data for future editions of the DSM than to accurately diagnose current 
afflictions. A pivotal change in the DSM-IV (APA, 1994) is the absence of passive 
aggressive personality disorder, which, as mentioned above, began to cleave away from its 
identity and the social understanding of its role or credible existence during the revised 
edition of the third DSM (APA, 1987). The cross-sectional, mimetic effect of passive 
aggressive personality with affective and anxiety disorders (while holding the variables of 
age, gender, and cultural assimilation constant) often results in more uncertainties and 
contradictions rather than solutions. Additionally, passive aggressive personality disorder 
potentially may not be distinguishable due to an inability to “reach the threshold” (p. 633) 
for qualification as a personality disorder and inconsistency of appearance throughout 
one’s life.  
  
                                                             
20 Contrary to the DSM-IV (APA, 1994) advisory against over-diagnosing or 
underdiagnosing certain disorders for males or females due to “social stereotypes about 
typical gender roles and behaviors” (p. 632), the preconceived notion already exists 
through the use of inflammatory criteria. 
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DSM-IV-TR (APA, 2000) Personality Disorders 
"A Personality Disorder is an enduring pattern of inner experience 
and behavior that deviates markedly from the expectations of the 
individual's culture, is pervasive and inflexible, has an onset in 
adolescence or early adulthood, is stable over time, and leads to 
distress or impairment," (American Psychiatric Association, 2000, p. 
685). 
Cluster A Cluster B Cluster C 
Paranoid Antisocial Avoidant 
Schizoid Borderline Dependent 
Schizotypal Histrionic Obsessive-Compulsive 
 Narcissistic  
Personality Disorder, Not Otherwise Specified (NOS) 
Table 3.6, Personality disorders listed in the DSM-IV-TR (APA, 2000). 
 While reviewing and examining the differences as it relates to Axis II personality 
disorders between DSM-IV (1994) and its successor, the DSM-IV-TR (2000), the 
differences are quite minimal and philosophical at best. Taking into consideration that the 
temporal distance between the fourth edition and its textual revision (DSM-IV and DSM-
IV-TR, respectively) is a mere six years, the elimination or addition of a new classification 
of personality disorders may appear quite absurd. That is not to say during the 
revision/critique stages that suggestions were not given by proponents who contend that 
“the new diagnoses were necessary to improve the coverage of the system by including a 
group of individuals that were undiagnosable in DSM-IV or diagnosable only under the 
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Not Otherwise Specified rubric,” (DSM-IV-TR; APA, 2000, p. xxviii)21. Adding further 
insult to injury, diagnoses included in the ICD-10 “were given somewhat more 
consideration than those that were being proposed fresh for DSM-IV,” (p. xxviii). That is 
to say, the diagnostic materials from which the United States desired to separate in 
decades past now lend more priority than suggestions by proponents critiquing a potential 
revision, which may create an air of dissonance between work groups and the review 
boards. 
 The clustered groups appear to be quite arbitrary and trivial, especially given that 
the creators of the DSM also question is validity and contend that the system has “serious 
limitations,” (DSM-IV-TR; APA, 2000, p. 686). It is possible then to further assume that 
the deletion of passive aggressive personality disorder from Cluster C is in part 
attributable to severe limitations regarding research, and a lack of cohesion with the other 
disorders within that specific cluster. Despite the elimination of passive aggressive 
personality disorder, which occurs in the DSM-IV (APA, 1994), it is still ever present 
under the classification of personality disorders not otherwise specified: “…the 
individual's personality pattern meets the general criteria for a Personality Disorder, but 
the individual is considered to have a Personality Disorder that is not included in the 
Classification (e.g., passive-aggressive personality disorder),” (DSM-IV-TR; APA, 2000, 
p. 685; DSM-IV; APA, 1994, p. 629). 
                                                             
21 The DSM-IV-TR warrants that, “We decided that, in general, new diagnoses should be 
included in the system only after research has established that they should be included 
rather than being included to stimulate that research,” (APA, 2000, p. xxviii). 
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 Tables 3.3b and 3.4b demonstrate the relationship between behavioral disorder 
diagnoses relating to children and adolescents and their maturation into an inherent and 
maladaptive set of personality characteristics. However, this relationship is not textually 
present in the DSM-IV (APA, 1994) or its revised edition, but it is still contextually 
understood by most that adhere to the assumption regarding a relationship trap of 
parenthetical ellipses. The relationships that are present and documented in the DSM-III 
(APA, 1980) and the DSM-III-R (APA, 1987), albeit deteriorated due to questionable 
validity and severe limitations, demonstrate that the damage and preconceptions of social 
understanding are already set in motion. Ergo, once a concept is embraced as rational, 
there is little need to alter its social utility until the contingencies of such demand 
adjustment. 
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DSM-V (APA, 2013) Personality Disorders 
"A Personality Disorder is an enduring pattern of inner 
experience and behavior that deviates markedly from the 
expectations of the individual's culture, is pervasive and 
inflexible, has an onset in adolescence or early adulthood, is 
stable over time, and leads to distress or impairment," 
(American Psychiatric Association, 2013, p. 645). 
General Personality Disorder 
Theme Trait Personality Disorders: 
Cluster A Cluster B Cluster C 
Paranoid Antisocial Avoidant 
Schizoid Borderline Dependent 
Schizotypal Histrionic Obsessive Compulsive 
 Narcissistic  
Other Personality Disorders 
Personality Change Due to Another Medical Condition 
I. Labile type II. Paranoid type 
III. Disinhibited type IV. Other type 
V. Aggressive type VI. Combined type 
VII. Apathetic type VIII. Unspecified type 
Other Specified Personality Disorders 
Unspecified Personality Disorder 
Table 3.7, Personality disorders listed in the DSM-V (APA, 2013). 
 After much anticipation over the span of nearly 20 years, the most recent edition, 
DSM-V (APA, 2013), appears to take a step back into nostalgia as it resembles 
classifications of earlier editions of the DSM (particularly the first edition from 1952). 
One major justification for the long delay of its presentation argues for the goal of 
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“harmonizing” the DSM-V (APA, 2013) with the upcoming publication of the ICD22 
produced by the World Health Organization. The reasons for the scientific harmonizing 
are as follows: 1) “The existence of two major classifications of mental disorders hinders 
the collection and use of national health statistics, the design of clinical trials aimed at 
developing new treatments, and the consideration of global applicability of the results by 
international regulatory agencies,” (DSM-V; APA, 2013, p. 11); 2) Competition creates 
complications in regards to replication “across national boundaries,” (p. 11); and 3) The 
DSM-IV and ICD-10 did not always agree in regards to “identical patient populations,” (p. 
11). For this reason and others, it is interesting that the creators of the DSM would choose 
the concept of harmonization in lieu of synchronicity.  
Synchronicity would specifically indicate that there is a sound uniformity within 
and between groups, as well as within and between the context of the DSM and ICD. The 
entire reason behind developing the DSM and the clinical modifications of the ICD is to 
modify classifications based on American standards of behavioral truths. Obviously, it is 
difficult to identify a uniform sample of individuals under the assumption of wholly 
identical features in one location; it is virtually impossible to identify two identical groups 
across national boundaries. For example, life experiences, gender stereotypes, community 
and familial structures, belief systems, and the regard held for physicians differ 
significantly from the United States and abroad. Likewise, the competition between the 
two major classification systems runs the gambit of ethical concerns, applicability and 
generalization of research findings and differing cultural interpretations of what is 
understood as normal and abnormal stimulates more contradiction than consensus. Thus, 
                                                             
22 Currently, the ICD-11 (WHO, 2017) will not be published for another three years. 
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instead of collaborating on the issues of current observation, both major classification 
systems compete in the present in order to continue a function of a future agenda.  For this 
reason and others, it is likewise interesting that the creators of the DSM would choose the 
concept of harmonization in lieu of dissonance. 
Theme trait personality disorders encompass Clusters A, B, and C which are 
essentially the same as those classified in the DSM-IV (APA, 1994) and DSM-IV-TR 
(APA, 2000), yet the umbrella terminology which encompasses them is unique to the 
current edition. Each theme is related to a specific cluster, and each cluster has a set of 
traits which differ from other traits; however, the entire umbrella represents an essential 
difference of identity from personality changes due to another medical condition and those 
that do not fit within the criteria of documented personality disorders. Furthermore, the 
possibility of the co-occurring diagnoses (5.7% for Cluster A, 1.5% for Cluster B, 6.0% 
for Cluster C, and 9.1% for any of the listed personality disorders; DSM-V; APA, 2013, p. 
646) is contradictory given the assumption that each cluster exists in order to differentiate 
itself from the others. Given the statistics of co-occurrence and the confounding 
information of differential, clustered traits, it should be understood that deviation lies 
within the eye of the beholder. 
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Figure 3.3, Illustrated depiction of cyclical retrograde (Hunter, 2014). 
Cyclical Retrograde. The anecdotal phrase “history repeats itself” may hold an ominous 
prophecy regarding the relationship between human behavior and society. A significant 
difference within the Axis II personality disorders listed in the DSM-V (APA, 2013) 
focuses on the expansion of the lower portion of Table 3.7 – personality changes due to 
another medical condition, other personality disorders, and unspecified personality 
disorders. An expansion of this magnitude is reminiscent of the first edition of the DSM 
published over sixty years ago, which bears the question of cyclical retrograde. As 
depicted above in Figure 3.2, the concept of cyclical retrograde represents a recycling 
process of resources, starting from archaic dichotomies, and adjusting their concepts to 
current context in order to fabricate current growth of understanding towards future 
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endeavors. The horizontal limit represents the ultimate curve capacity of inertia upon 
reaching a straight line, and the point of which stabilization must compensate from the 
bottom to support the infrastructure. From this point, the cyclical process will continue 
upwards until it reaches yet another horizontal limit, and thus expand horizontally from 
the base once again. Are we as a society approaching the horizontal limit of knowledge in 
respect to human behavior? At this point in time, has an assumption of normalcy through 
defining its opponent reached its maximum? What are the future implications of recycling 
the past? 
The addition of personality change due to a medical condition does not follow the 
usual trend of diagnosing personality disorders; the change must be present for at least one 
year, it is diagnosable in children, it is not a true disorder, and it is not organic. This 
grouping of personality changes represents a shift in personality in lieu of a maladaptive 
trait or set of traits, where assessments conclude that the change is a “direct 
pathophysiological consequence of another medical condition,” (DSM-V; APA, 2013, p. 
682). Moreover, the individual may even recognize the “distress or impairment” which 
accompanies their change in personality as a result of the medical condition. The 
description of each subtype is based on observation, which appears quite redundant but is 
described as such: 1) Labile type represents a predominant feature of affective breakdown 
or change; 2) Disinhibited type represents a predominant feature of poor or absent impulse 
control; 3) Aggressive type represents a predominant feature of aggressive behavior; 4) 
Apathetic type represents a predominant feature of “marked apathy and indifference” (p. 
682); 5) Paranoid type represents a predominant feature of “suspiciousness or paranoid 
ideation” (p. 682); 6) Other type represents a feature which is “not characterized by any of 
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the above subtypes,” (p. 682); 7) Combined type represents the predominance of more 
than one feature; and 8) Unspecified type. In reflection, this category of personality 
changes should be regrouped with affective disorders given the criteria from which it is 
acquired. 
General diagnostic criteria for a Personality Disorder 
A. An enduring pattern of inner experience and behavior that deviates 
markedly from the expectations of the individual's culture. This pattern is 
manifested in two (or more) of the following areas:  
(1) cognition (i.e., ways of perceiving and interpreting self, other people, and 
events. 
(2) affectivity (i.e., the range, intensity, lability, and appropriateness of 
emotional response). 
(3) interpersonal functioning 
(4) impulse control 
B. The enduring pattern is inflexible and pervasive across a broad range of 
personal and social situations. 
C. The enduring pattern leads to clinically significant distress or impairment 
in social, occupational, or other important areas of functioning. 
D. The pattern is stable and of long duration, and its onset can be traced back 
at least to adolescence or early adulthood. 
E. The enduring pattern is not better accounted for as a manifestation or 
consequence of another mental disorder. 
F. The enduring pattern is not due to the direct physiological effects of a 
substance (e.g., a drug of abuse, a medication) or a general medical condition 
(e.g., head trauma). 
Table 3.8, General diagnostic criteria for a personality disorder (DSM-V; APA, 2013, p. 
646-647).  
 In Table 3.8, the general diagnostic criteria for a personality disorder is provided in 
order for the reader to collect their own opinions regarding the description of a new 
subsection of personality disorders presented in the DSM-V (APA, 2014) and its 
dissonance in comparison to the above criteria. Even more damaging, and present 
throughout the entire span of the seven still-frames, is the absence of success rates for 
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coexistence with or potential cures for personality disorder. Personality disorders are such 
because they are perceived by others as abnormal and thus brought to the individual’s 
attention that may remain otherwise unaware. Post hoc ergo propter hoc23 provides 
justification to the general public and the physician alike, where the consequences of 
affected individual’s behavior is due to their inability to conform to a prototypical set of 
standards (as it relates to normal behavior). After the maladaptive trait is located, it is 
because of this deviation that the individual is abnormal and will remain semi-transparent 
and therefore ostracized. Moreover, the interaction between the individual, the physician, 
and society as a whole will adhere to observing and enacting this set of stereotypical 
behaviors because it is understood as reality. In this respect, the physician has created an 
infinite liar’s paradox in which a disorder is able to be discovered and understood yet 
cannot be reversed or minimized. 
 Michel Foucault dedicated his academic career to examining the historical 
derivation of social abnormalities, their current function, and possible future implications. 
By utilizing Michel Foucault (1963, 1964) and borrowing concepts from George Herbert 
Mead (1934), new critical positions were formulated in order to explain the current 
argument of contextual madness and potentially open windows to release stale catchalls. 
In closing this chapter, one may feel a dizzying sensation concerning the questionable 
reality and the social position of insanity. In the following chapter, the peak of Hunter’s 
(2014) hierarchy of social adhesion, themed medicalization and punishment, will be 
discussed. Moreover, Peter Conrad’s (2007) The Medicalization of Society: On the 
Transformation of Human Conditions into Treatable Disorders will lend great utility in 
                                                             
23 Latin, which translates to “after this, therefore because of this”.  
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transitioning the focus to medicalizing a nation and its impact on the current social 
relationship between the population and the medical and pharmaceutical industry. So, just 
as the chapter began, it will end with this caption: 
“Madness deals not so much with truth and the world, as with 
man and whatever truth about himself he is able to perceive,” 
(Foucault, 1964, p. 27). 
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Chapter Four 
 
“No man chooses evil because it is evil; he only mistakes it for 
happiness, the good he seeks,” (Mary Wollstonecraft, 1790, p. 39). 
 
 It appears that the unreason within the madman is steadily consistent while their 
position within society steadily shifts and the context of abnormality is adaptive. The 
arrangement of the previous chapter provides a philosophical ensemble of the 
archaeological layers of madness, a concept which at its core still represents a state of non-
being. The madman, or the insane, appears to never be aware of their state or civil law – 
both of which are used against them in their alienation and ostracism. Furthermore, the 
approach to the organization and management of the insane adapts at face value, but the 
ultimate goal of control survives throughout the centuries. Psychoanalysis, and 
psychology overall, expands its sovereign gaze through and over a larger population; the 
political and economic spheres of technologically-advanced and advancing Western 
cultures, specifically American culture, capitalizes on the management of behavior. 
In Chapter Three, the introduction of a new heuristic device, Hunter’s hierarchy of 
social adhesion (2014, p. 34), is an analytical tool that demonstrates lower-level social 
adhesion, which systematically conforms to maintain seamless contextual synchronicity, 
to portray current concreteness and rationality with a futuristic trajectory. Given that the 
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device is utilized to critically analyze a possible conception of uniform behaviors and its 
functional outliers, there must be a succession of levels, or “rungs”, from the ground-up 
that are solidified as social truths and rationality. In order to embrace said truths and 
rationale, they must first be internalized; Chapter Two discusses the first three rungs of the 
pyramidal device in detail (and revisited in the third chapter) as means to a conformist 
end. Moreover, those individuals who apparently cannot internalize civil law are 
ostracized and alienated; every quality that is human-like is parenthesized, ergo their 
identity and disease is one in the same. Chapter Three utilizes the adjustment of disordered 
behaviors listed in the seven editions of the DSM (APA) to exemplify the transitive 
placement of the madman from one of spiritual and religious evils to a diseased mind.  
Power is given to those who can define and inhibit the possibility of opposition via 
monopolization of thought. In this case, power is a very potent form of inhibition because 
it is based on suppressing the other from being able to create an alternative. More 
specifically, power is sustained by the ability to repackage the perimeters of old 
definitions and present them as new by defending that cutting edge research is applied to a 
moving target. The United States is a grandiose nation of medical enterprise, or more 
specifically, an example of medical jurisdiction elitism. In turn, the DSM is a moving 
target within the medical enterprise; it is apparently stable but changes over the course of 
time to reflect the vulnerability of the American population. The implications of an ever-
expanding medical jurisdiction is that it has snowballed into an overarching component of 
social control, with implications on both the macro (e.g., economics, hospitalization) and 
micro (i.e., shaping self-definitions) scale of social realities. It is imperative for 
sociologists to research this growing social concern because the political nature of 
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diagnostic criteria is the new American ego, where citizens believe that they are both 
vulnerable and dependent upon medicalization, which in turn serves to reaffirm the 
position of current composites of knowledge. 
In the current chapter, the top of the pyramid – Medicalization and Punishment – 
will first be discussed with the assistance of Peter Conrad’s (2007) The Medicalization of 
Society to highlight the interwoven relationship between the physician and the patient. 
Moreover, a Foucauldian approach will supplement the current argument of politicizing 
health via discourse provided by a gaze that is both above and throughout society. Upon 
the brief completion of this multifaceted dependence, the rest of the chapter will highlight 
the political consciousness of dueling archaic dichotomies and the illusion behind 
American Exceptionalism. As a note for the reader, you may ask yourself throughout the 
current chapter, “How did we not open our eyes sooner?” 
“Medicine must no longer be confined to a body of techniques for 
curing ills and of the knowledge that they require; it will also 
embrace a knowledge of the healthy man, that is, a study of the 
non-sick man and a definition of the model man,” (Foucault, 1963, 
p. 34). 
 
Medicalization and Punishment. The top of the pyramid in Hunter’s (2014) hierarchy of 
social adhesion describes the final rung of social order and conformity. Medicalization and 
punishment describes both the social and individual dependence of pharmaceuticals and 
the control of individuals who cannot internalize the code of self-preservation as it is 
socially accepted. Foucault (1963) explains that prior to the end of the eighteenth century, 
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the orientation of medicine “related much more to health than to normality,” (p. 35); more 
specifically, a prototype representing normality did not yield the same value in 
comparison to the restoration from illness. However, by the nineteenth century, the 
“prestige of the sciences” (Foucault, 1963, p. 35) creates a priority for normalcy in those 
concepts and interventions which function within a standard dichotomy of healthy/not 
healthy (or normal/not normal). The rationality for this transition lies within the belief of 
society, not the individual, as one that can excel or decline; succeed or degenerate; a 
civilization that can make the example or be the example. Indeed, this myopic view is 
quite cynical but it is what separates “us” from “them”.  
 The medical gaze is sovereign; it reigns through society as well as above it, and 
within it contains the knowledge of diseases and their maladies. Moreover, the 
containment of disease and methods of intervention has become politicized through 
specialized government departments, pamphlets, inspectors, and statistics. The doctor is a 
means to an end, an instrument, and the “priests of the body” (p. 32); the responsibility of 
the church to the ill has now been replaced by the doctor, whose obligation to treating the 
sick is a “sacred task” (Foucault, 1963, p. 32) to provide to the nation. The doctor merely 
eliminates the individual in order to inspect the disease and its maladies, from which 
knowledge will restore the individual back to a state of relative normalcy. It is likewise 
from this relationship that the doctor and the patient are dependent in both survival and 
legitimacy; they are the spectacle and the scaffold, from which the particular knowledge of 
the doctor parallels that of the skilled executioner. 
 Health and normalcy can only be sustained if managed through control on various 
scales; regulations for illness prevention are piously implemented and health inspections 
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function at the local level of supervision. Institutions house the insane (i.e., the mentally 
ill) while physical illnesses remain domestic, yet the goal is not to indefinitely cure the 
individual against the threat of freedom and the exposure of a flawed government. 
Moreover, through monitoring the ill and the insane, it is possible for the government to 
acquire their information and to maintain their autonomous power as well as the 
permanent position of the sacred physician. In summation, the individual’s body is a 
prison susceptible to punishment and through its function of maintaining a submissive role 
far distanced from liberation.  
 As society strengthens (and depends upon) its relationship with medicine, 
sociology likewise expands to investigate the implications of this relationship. As it relates 
to the medical jurisdiction of the twentieth century, Conrad (2007) defines medicalization 
as “a process by which nonmedical problems become defined and treated as medical 
problems, usually in terms of illness and disorders,” (p. 4); the growth of which 
demonstrates a powerful transformation in Western medicine. Conrad (2007) alludes to a 
set of questions which are paramount in the investigation of the impact of expansion of 
medical problems, which will be reiterated here: given that the amount of life problems 
categorized as a medical concern has skyrocketed in the past fifty years, could this be 
interpreted as “a new epidemic of medical problems” (p. 3) or an advancement in the 
identification and intervention of existing issues? Or is it possible that a wider range of life 
problems have snowballed into diagnosable medical problems despite questionable 
legitimacy? 
 Conrad (2007) explains that “it is important to remember that medicalization 
describes a process,” (p. 5); medicalization lies within its conceptualization in regards to 
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medical terminology and language, as well as its adoption, application, and treatment 
(Conrad, 2007). The growing concern of medicalization in the discipline of sociology 
relates to the dozens of arising examples according to gender, personal experiences, 
behavior, and age; as such, a “corresponding body of literature has loosely been called [… 
the] ‘medicalization theory’ (Williams & Calnan, 1996),” (Conrad, 2007, p. 5). 
Problematic concerns that arise throughout one’s life are not illnesses or disorders without 
being accepted as such, and while medical professionals may hold a large percentage of 
influence, “some active agents are necessary for most problems to become medicalized,” 
(Conrad, 2007, p. 6). Legitimacy may be quite biased, depending on its substantiality; the 
premises of problematic concerns may be objective to the individual (the patient or 
physician) or a group and it is often the education provided by the media where the 
presence of a perceived medical problem is dispersed. 
 Medicalization is bidirectional, which means that there exists both an “expansion 
of medical jurisdiction” (p. 7) and demedicalization, which occurs as the result of a 
problem no longer appearing appropriate to receive medical treatment24 (Conrad, 2007). 
The perception of symptoms within a heavily medicalized Western society are distorted to 
a point of lower thresholds and less tolerance for the most mild of symptoms, and bodily 
distress or discomfort are magnified and reformulated as a legitimate disease (Conrad, 
2007). In regards to active agents, cases which arise for medicalization (or 
demedicalization) may be accomplished by a social movement, patient organizations, or 
                                                             
24 In regards to demedicalization, there are two cases to arise during the twentieth century 
– homosexuality and masturbation, with the former as the result of advocacy and a social 
movement (Conrad, 2007).  
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even individuals and later adopted by physicians as a disease or illness (Conrad, 2007). “In 
recent years,” Conrad (2007) argues, “corporate entities like the pharmaceutical industry 
and potential patients as consumers have begun to play more significant roles in 
medicalization,” (p. 6). Moreover, it appears to be that medicalization legitimizes life 
experiences as being pathological by expanding condition classifications and the 
narrowing particularity of what is socially acceptable and normal. 
 As contended by Conrad (2007) “the greatest social control power comes from 
having the authority to define certain behaviors, persons and things,” (Conrad & 
Schneider, 1992, p. 8; see Conrad, 2007, p. 8). Medicalization points the focus of the 
problem originating from the individual rather than the environment which encompasses 
them. It is undeniably easier to diagnose, treat, and rehabilitate the individual than to 
appropriate a collective blame and address possible solutions for society as a whole. With 
an expanding medical jurisdiction, “medicalization increases the amount of medical social 
control over human behavior,” (Conrad, 2007, p. 8) and will ultimately replace all other 
forms of social control – ergo, mass sedation. However, the grassroots of medicalization 
as it relates to mental health began during the latter half of the nineteenth century, where 
accessibility to therapy (disciplined in psychoanalysis) was exclusively for individuals 
with a disposable income. 
Psychoanalysis and a Political Consciousness 
 Psychoanalytic therapy, in retrospect, is quite time-consuming and expensive; 
typically, therapy includes an intimate, one-on-one appointment with the therapist and 
client for approximately one hour, several times per week, over the course of several 
months (or more commonly, years). During therapy, the client is encouraged to freely 
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associate in order to understand their behavior or motives, which may remain 
unconscious, and how it affects their relationships with others and their pattern of 
consciousness (American Psychoanalytic Association, 2014). Over the course of these 
appointments, the goal of therapy is to establish a safe relationship with the therapist in 
order to unearth repressed experiences and analyze how it affects current aspects of the 
client’s life. The therapist engages in providing “enlightenment” to the client by providing 
insight to their limitations in order to remove said barriers and alter their perception of the 
world and themselves. With that in mind, it is undoubtedly exhausting to provide therapy 
to several clients over the span of many years and impossible to provide such attention to a 
majority of the population. Moreover, psychoanalysis is manipulative as it relates to the 
therapist altering the behavior of the client; given that its practice is discriminatively 
exclusive in preference for the powerful, the behavior of the elite is structured to be 
exemplary. 
 The dominant class remains relatively exclusive in order to reflect the status quo, 
and the transition of the dominant practice from psychoanalysis to psychiatry reflects an 
expansion of the sovereign gaze. Psychoanalytical therapy is to the elite as 
institutionalization is to the subservient class; accessibility accentuates privilege and the 
dueling classes shape the role and function of its counterpart. The first two editions of the 
DSM reflect the dominant discipline of psychology at the time of their publications – 
psychoanalysis, which contends that personality disorders are the manifestation of 
unconscious factors that affect behavior. More specifically, personality disorders distort 
the balance of power between the id and superego, so it is the position of the therapist to 
take upon the role as the client’s ego. By imposing the identification of what it means to 
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be normal, the elite can project an image of superiority and thusly externalize the ego to 
the majority in exchange for their internalization of a generic identity. However, it is the 
imposition of an American document (i.e., the DSM), formulated by an authority of an 
exempt select few, who assemble an extreme form of American Exceptionalism via 
unconscious observation. 
American Exceptionalism is a sociological theory which warrants that the United 
States is a capitalist, democratic country that is qualitatively different from other nations 
(Lipset, 1996). Lipset (1996) explains that the United States is the product of revolution 
and surrounds itself in “a set of dogmas about the nature of a good society,” (p. 31). More 
specifically, the notion of American Exceptionalism entails that the United States and its 
people differ from other countries in regards to economic superiority and political 
strength, which entitles the United States to be representative of the “correct model” of 
aspiration for other countries. As a self-sufficient, autonomous, democratic economy, the 
U.S. government gets to define how other countries’ governments are inadequate through 
a typology of flaws (e.g., authoritarian, totalitarian) which ultimately extends to their 
citizens as well. “Americanism,” Lipset (1996) contends, “as different people have 
pointed out, is an ‘ism’ or ideology in the same way that communism or fascism or 
liberalism are isms,” (p. 31).  
The core of American Exceptionalism is to separate what is good from bad and to 
associate this dichotomy with separatism – “us” or “not us”. Americanism is perceivably 
quite myopic and vastly different from other nationalists; in specific, it is a country that 
does not share an identity based solely on history. To be an American is to accept its 
values, nee birthright. Furthermore, Americanism and being an American is an 
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“ideological commitment,” (Lipset, 1996, p. 31) in lieu of a sense of community, despite 
other political agendas (e.g., communist Englishmen; Lipset, 1996). Moreover, American 
conservatism is weak in comparison to European and Canadian polities; in America, an 
“obligation of the leaders of society and the economy to protect the less fortunate,” 
(Lipset, 1996, p. 35) is a mirage. The allure of Americanism, success, and potential 
citizenry is quite appealing to immigrants because they are unconsciously observing from 
the valley the function of a nation set on top of a hill. In this regard, those individuals who 
are looking from afar in adoration have accepted American values wholeheartedly without 
reading the fine print. 
 Given that the DSM is the product of militarization, it may also be understood that 
the military is an extension of politics, and thus, the dichotomy of DSM diagnoses parallel 
with dichotomies of political typology. In regards to psychoanalysis, the extent to which 
the DSM utilizes such a discipline to develop a model of contextual normality is relatively 
weakened by an inability to supplement classifications with scientific research. 
Psychoanalysis in the DSM, in turn, is the final “hoorah” of the pre-electronic age and the 
transition to psychiatry by the third edition of the DSM (APA, 1980) has political ties 
relating to the Cold War, advancing technology, ideologies, and the preservation of 
duality. Psychiatry allows for scientific research to expand classifications and the 
elaboration of abnormal human behavior; more broadly, to reform typology to something 
that is new and fresh yet biologically confirming of past biases and status quo. Moreover, 
the DSM and its current discipline of psychiatry maintains the status quo because it is 
etiologically the same, yet garbed in unchallenging scientific research that is confirmed as 
legitimate because it is functional to the existence of American Exceptionalism. 
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Number of Diagnoses, Number of Personality Disorders Diagnoses, and Total Number 
of Pages in the DSM Versions I-V (American Psychiatric Association, 1952-2013) 
Version Year 
Total 
Number of 
Diagnoses 
Total 
Number of 
Personality 
Disorders 
Total Number of Pages 
(Total Number of 
Pages for Personality 
Disorder Diagnoses) 
    
I 1952 106 24 130(8) 
II 1968 182 12 134(3) 
III 1980 265 14 494(25) 
III-R 1987 292 12 567(23) 
IV 1994 297 11 886(44) 
IV-TR 2000 365 11 915(44) 
V 2013 380 13 947(39) 
Table 4.1, Number of diagnoses, number of personality disorder diagnoses, and total 
number of pages in the DSM versions I-V (APA, 1952-2013), adapted from Mayes & 
Horwitz (2005; see Conrad, 2007). 
 Table 4.1 provides a digestible comprehension of each version of the DSM as it 
relates to their total number of diagnoses, the total number of personality disorder 
diagnoses, and the total number of pages. While the books may appear intimidating by 
their weight and size, a hefty portion of the text relates to properly utilizing the diagnostic 
material as well as an elaboration in regards to criteria, symptomology, and prevalence 
rates (e.g., sex ratio, age, co-morbidities) for each disorder. However, what is of particular 
intrigue is twofold. Firstly, the relationship between the total number of diagnoses and the 
total number of pages displays a peculiar result. In the first edition of the DSM (APA, 
1952), there are 106 diagnoses within 130 pages of text and by the next edition in 1968, an 
additional 76 diagnoses are squeezed into an additional 4 pages of text. Furthermore, as 
psychiatry becomes the discipline of choice (over psychoanalysis), the third edition of the 
DSM in 1980 contains 265 diagnoses within 494 pages of text. This is important to note 
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because, as mentioned earlier, psychiatry incorporates scientific research in order to 
elaborate with further “expertise” and confidence that what is legitimately disordered is 
exemplified by scientific support. Moreover, after the third edition, the positive 
relationship between diagnoses and page numbers has sharply increased in the following 
four versions, with particular attention to be focused on page numbers in relation to total 
diagnoses. 
Secondly, the relationship between the total number of personality disorder 
diagnoses and the total number of pages demonstrates a negative relationship over the 
span of the seven published versions. In the first edition of the DSM, there are a total of 24 
personality disorder diagnoses within the 130 total pages, 8 of which cover personality 
disorder diagnoses; by the second edition in 1968, there are 12 personality disorder 
diagnoses within 134 total pages with only three pages dedicated to personality disorder 
diagnoses. Psychoanalysis, which particularly focuses on disorders of the personality (or 
more specifically, the imbalance of the id and superego and its effect on the individual) 
enters into the diagnostic world with a thunderous roar and quickly subsides by the second 
edition. Moreover, by the third edition and onward (with minor exceptions), the number of 
personality disorder diagnoses decline in number but increase in depth; for example, in the 
DSM-IV-TR (APA, 2000), there are 11 personality disorder diagnoses and 44 pages 
which explain the diagnoses. Moreover, by the fifth edition of the DSM in 2013, there are 
13 diagnoses and 39 pages which discuss the diagnoses. Given this minor insight with the 
use of comparisons in Table 4.1, it would appear that power is the ability to define as well 
as the perimeters and necessity for elaborating upon its truths.  
 During World War II, Allied forces were fighting against a larger enemy (i.e., Axis 
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nations) which viewed Western capitalism and communism as the deterioration of 
civilization. The “Big Three” Allied forces (i.e., United States, Britain, and Soviet Russia) 
cooperated with one another against a larger enemy which threatened their position of 
power, despite their political differences. However, after the end of WWII and the 
enforcement of the Marshall Plan, the anonymity between the Western Bloc (more 
specifically, American democracy) and Eastern Bloc is amplified during a 30-year 
political and militaristic standoff for world leadership. Albeit there was never a combat 
utilizing force between the two superpowers, the ominous political competition and 
readiness for a full-scale nuclear attack affected every asset of American life. The United 
States sought to differentiate itself in every way possible from Soviet Russia, leading the 
government and more specifically, the military, to become a quasi-factor in implementing 
power for the elite and a reaffirmation of dueling typologies.  
 Chapter Three explains that there is a relative consistency to the world and reality, 
where the non-problematic concept of normality is frequently approached. By looking at 
the political economy, an answer to the question of searching for normalcy and 
approaching punishment reveals that normalcy is desired because there is nothing 
superior. Normalcy separates “us” from “them” by implementing its truths into the core of 
the social group – their identity. The DSM is an inventory system that reports what the 
United States conceptualizes as reality and how its citizens function within the given 
reality. The DSM functions to weed out abnormalities in human behavior while providing 
a perception of justice for separatism. More specifically, it would appear that the DSM has 
served its purpose of a political master model of duality because it provides maintenance 
of political consciousness and coercion. Moreover, it is when Americans begin to embrace 
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these aspects as wholly truthful that duality is able to be sustained without a second 
thought, which serves to preserve their existence and exemplify the superiority of 
technology and capitalism. The government is a product of coercion by which the elite are 
coercive because the general population desires that way of life; therefore, implementing 
the clause of separatism and superiority is accomplished through such a purpose of duality 
and normalcy.  
 The pre-modern religious dualities relates to dichotomies of healthy/not healthy, or 
sacred/not sacred to provide a notion of self-serving ethnocentrism. As technology begins 
to envelop every facet of American capitalism and Western medicine, a new affirmation 
of duality struggles to define what is healthy and not healthy, so the direction of 
dichotomies is geared towards defining what is normal through what it is not with the 
assistance of science and technology. Normalcy cannot be defined because it would 
constrain the elite and show the irrationality underlying normalcy and the relationship 
between the elite and subservient. The solution becomes tinkering and shifting the 
perimeters of abnormal behaviors around to make the same concept appear new during 
temporal progression, which is strengthened under the guise of a political agenda. In 
specific, the DSM successfully separates Americans from the “other” by being a model of 
aspirations for other countries, which reaffirms the notion of its citizens being 
qualitatively different from other countries. Furthermore, the DSM domestically separates 
the subservient class from the elite by reaffirming the power of the elite to maintain a 
society by which the subservient class agrees to abide in return for protection and a life of 
comfort.  
 As briefly discussed in the current chapter, power lies within the ability to define 
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and inhibit contestation or alternative thinking. Power has transformed a nation born from 
revolution into the standardization for other nations, coupled by a set of dogmas enveloped 
in myopic ideologies and values. With the assistance of Lipset (1996), American 
Exceptionalism highlights how the United States has turned its ideologies and polity into 
an ism unlike any other, where allegiance supersedes birthright and power remains 
selfishly within the hands of a few (i.e., the elite). As a demonstration of its debilitating 
power, the United States utilizes the DSM as a reaffirmation of power and politics to 
define what is normal by highlighting what is contextually abnormal. Throughout the 
history of the DSM and its seven editions, science has capitalized on supporting these 
diagnoses and moreover, encapsulated an entire nation to submission and dependence. 
With the help of Conrad (2007), medicalization accentuates the implications of a 
widespread medical jurisdiction on both a macro and micro scale of American economics 
and the importance for sociological research. No longer are occurrences throughout the 
lifespan seen as such, nor are personalities to be unique; advocacy groups, people, and 
physicians play a role in the legitimization of disorders and diseases. Furthermore, the top 
rung of Hunter’s (2014) hierarchy of social adhesion, Medicalization and Punishment, is 
discussed at the beginning of the current chapter and describes the sovereign gaze which 
parenthesizes the individual and their attributes. Moreover, the influence of science and 
the physician has replaced religion and the church, as they are now the “priests of the 
body” (Foucault, 1963, p. 32) and shape the current state of reality. 
 In the following chapter, a summary of the current thesis will cover what the 
purposes of its defense are, as well as future research and its implications for what is now 
uncovered. Likewise, the proposed hypotheses from the introduction will be revisited and 
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a personal revelation will close the chapter of the book, as well as one chapter in the life of 
a scholar.
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Chapter Five 
“War is peace. Freedom is slavery. Ignorance is strength,” (1984; George 
Orwell, 1949, p. 6). 
First and foremost, I will open this final chapter by defending my position to write 
in first-person. Given the nature of the current defense, it would appear quite hypocritical 
to explain my position from an omniscient and encompassing perspective. I do not claim 
to be any wiser or knowledgeable than my neighbor, and I humbly give my gratitude to 
those who have opened my eyes to a realization beyond science and standardization. As I 
have made this journey through the current defense, I have questioned myself and 
struggled against the currents of abstract thinking, far beyond what my background in 
psychology could provide. Within my defense, I aim to provide another way of thinking 
about reality and the function of society, at least from the point of view that seven still-
frames impact the perception of the American way of life. In the current chapter, I will 
first briefly summarize a few major points of my defense, followed by revisiting the 
hypotheses from the first chapter, as well as possibilities for future research and 
implications. In closing the chapter, I will discuss a few limitations from the study, as 
well as implications for future research
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A major theme of my defense is the influence of elitism as well as the function of 
individuals and subservient groups within society. My arguments are made possible by 
utilizing the works of Marcuse (1964), Foucault (1963, 1964), the medicalization theory 
provided by Conrad (2007), and the theory of American Exceptionalism as briefly 
provided by Lipset (1996) to make one point abundantly clear: power lies in the details. 
Moreover, my defense is framed around hegemony, yet it is not credited and must 
therefore be given its breath now. Antonio Gramsci, a member of the Italian Communist 
Party during the first half of the twentieth century, coined the term hegemony to reflect 
its sovereignty through many social devices, including churches, schools, trade unions, 
and within the household (Kertzer, 1979). Hegemonic control implies that whatever the 
view of the nation or the world may be at a given time, it is accepted and becomes “part 
of what is thought of as common sense,” (p. 324). Moreover, successful “‘dominant 
conception’ … becomes a ‘faith’ which is not consciously articulated,” (p. 324) and it is 
what keeps contradictions from collapsing and ultimately overthrowing all that is 
controllably accepted as truth as well as securing the position of the coercive party. 
Discussion 
American politics controls and manipulates nearly every facet of the economy, 
from education, employment, technology, militarization, to medicalization and 
everything in between. As common sense, or dominant conception, relates to 
medicalization and psychiatry, the DSM articulates a notion of common sense that has 
never been done before. The DSM is a materialization of discriminatory dichotomies 
which functions to articulate how and why an individual is abnormal and it avoids 
contradiction by shifting its perimeters around via revisions and updated versions. 
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Moreover, the newness of each edition prompts that scientific research and harmonization 
provide groundbreaking details, thus securing the value of its truths and the position of 
the elite. In congruence with symbolic interactionism, concepts such as ego-syntonic and 
maladaptive are useful to describe abnormalities because the problem no longer depends 
upon the detection of the individual but how others view that individual within the 
perimeters of an idealist reality. 
 The functional position of the madman throughout history has transitioned from 
folly and tales, to apocalyptic nightmares meandering upon an aimless ship, to 
institutionalized livestock, to parenthesized subjects residing on the negative scale of a 
dangerous dichotomy. Concurrently, the physical position of the madman has gradually 
transitioned from the perimeters to the center as the methods for control has gradually 
refined a course of containment and observation. Furthermore, the connection to the 
DSM and the unconscious observation of other nations lies within this understanding of 
the madman’s transitional purpose; by corralling the insane towards the center, power is 
easily reinforced and societal shame is hidden. In specific, by containing the insane (and 
the subservient class in extension) within the center of society, their presence does not 
blemish our impression as the leader on the world stage. It is with this realization in mind 
that Foucault’s (1964) concept of “madness of vain presumption” (p. 29; see p. 44) is 
applicable to an entire nation. To recant the question that was posed earlier, which asks 
“how then, with all respect, is the ‘normal’ population of society any different than the 
madman to whom is caged?” (p. 44) the answer is that we are all caged – we are all 
parenthesized.  
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 Two hypotheses were stated in the introduction of my defense, and will now be 
revisited to gage their accuracy. The first hypothesis states that the transition from 
psychoanalysis to psychiatry in the DSM-III (APA, 1980) will result in an expected 
increase in the average amount of personality disorder classifications. Contrary to my 
initial assumption, the transition to psychiatry as the dominant discipline in psychology 
actually results in an initial decrease in the total number of personality disorder 
classifications, as demonstrated in Table 4.1. However, my first hypothesis is not wholly 
incorrect; in the DSM-V (APA, 2013), there appears to be an increase in the number of 
personality disorder classifications as well as the breadth of information reported. There 
are 13 personality disorder classifications in the DSM-V (APA, 2013), which is one more 
classification than the DSM-III-R (APA, 1987) and one less classification than in the 
DSM-III (1980). Likewise, while the total number of personality disorder classifications 
has generally expressed a downward trend, the number of pages which cover Axis II 
personality disorder classifications has reflected a nearly twofold increase since the third 
version of the DSM. 
The second hypothesis states that since the introduction of psychiatry as the 
dominant discipline of professional psychology, the revisions and refinement of published 
personality disorder classifications correlates in a political manner which separates 
American behavior from the “other” as well as from one another. Throughout my defense, 
I try to include historical context around the DSM publications, particularly during the 
height of the Cold War and the Stonewall riots. It is to my understanding that the political 
agenda geared for the DSM-III is twofold in contribution – advocacy and adversarial. In 
regards to advocacy, the LGBTQ community experienced a civil rights movement after 
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the Stonewall riots, including growing demands to eradicate homosexuality from the 
DSM.  
As the political agenda relates to adversarial is in response to the duality between 
two superpowers, namely the Soviet Union and the United States. American ideologies 
did not tolerate resistance and sought to qualitatively differentiate itself and its citizens 
from communism and the citizens behind the Iron Curtain. In order to provide substantial 
justifications for a myopic dichotomy (i.e. “us”/”not us”, “normal/not normal”) to be 
common sense, scientific research provided a posteriori justification for abnormal or 
deviant behavior. Lastly, the rise in the number of personality disorders in the current 
version of the DSM may parallel the number of classifications from the DSM-III (APA, 
1980) – political conflict. 
Limitations 
Comparison limitations. With one minor exception to the trend noted in the relationship 
between classification numbers and page numbers which discuss personality disorders, the 
DSM-V (2013) serves to be an exception, albeit not significant. The decrease in number of 
pages covering Axis II personality disorder classifications and the increase in the number 
of personality disorder classifications may reflect a lack of evidence to fully support the 
new classifications, despite their perceived legitimacy for inclusion on the classification 
roster. 
Cross-cultural limitations. A cross-cultural analysis of biomedicine cannot be conducted 
since biomedicine concerns Western medicine, including psychology. However, countries 
that are integrating biomedicine into their practices (e.g. India and China) may serve as 
useful comparisons for later research.
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Conclusion and Future Research 
 Now that the information has been presented, what should be taken away from my 
defense? Upon completion of my defense, I have to admit that while I have not provided 
tangible change to the research world, it is my hope that my approach to the current state 
of affairs as it relates to the DSM and American Exceptionalism will inspire others to 
think outside of the box. The implications of medical jurisdiction are rapidly expanding 
and need to be researched from a sociological approach because it affects society on both 
a macro and micro scale, especially ethical and moral concerns. Ethically, medicalization 
and the DSM give the impression that the United States, its citizens, and their medical 
concerns are legitimately, qualitatively different. In specific, individuals seek to find 
answers to benign concerns that were previously accepted as changes throughout their 
lives. Likewise, the DSM is responsible for reaffirming the belief that American citizens 
are qualitatively different from other nations, as well as qualitatively different from one 
another. 
 False needs are emphasized through the media, particularly advertisements and 
technology, and this includes medicalization. Morally, medicalization suffocates 
American citizens by accentuating relatively mild symptoms to be attributable to bodily 
malfunction. Americans are preoccupied with avoiding the aging process, ostracism, and 
mental defect that medicalization results in a multi-billion dollar industry and a nation that 
is drowning in financial debt. The DSM, and particularly personality disorder 
classifications, is a materialized articulation which justifies that abnormalities are 
problematic and encourages unconscious separatism from within the nation and abroad. 
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Elitists are profiting from the subservient class’ dependence on pharmaceuticals, 
incarceration, social desirability, and comfort without contestation. 
It should be clarified that the DSM is a valuable tool, but the value may not be in 
relation to justifying its practicality in psychiatry (and more broadly, psychology). The 
compartmentalized, cultural specificity of the DSM is unique to the United States, but its 
value is specific to the political and economic reality of the given moment. Moreover, the 
DSM keeps businesses functioning; the DSM acts as an intermediary device for 
psychology and therapy, which fuels other businesses (e.g., intervention, pharmaceutical 
representatives) and prevents the infrastructure of psychology from collapsing. Advances 
in the name of science and technology are accredited for improved expertise of the 
individual and their conditions, instead of accepting imminent death. The DSM, 
specifically the third through fifth editions, utilizes science and technology to justify the 
borders of reality for subservient social groups. In a more broad sense, the DSM functions 
as a check and balance for compartmentalization, business excursion, and inadvertently 
articulating the parameters of behavior and thought by emphasizing what is socially 
unacceptable or abnormal.  
 Future research should include deeper historical research as it relates to diagnostic 
tools and criteria which serve as a basis for current biomedical research. Likewise, more 
sociological and anthropological research should investigate American Exceptionalism 
from an interdisciplinary perspective in order to understand the impact of science and 
technology on nationalist ideologies. Lastly, future research should include cross-cultural 
analyses with non-Western medicine as it pertains to mental disorders, behavior, and the 
societal function of the abnormal. In conclusion, the madman may still represent 
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apocalyptic premonitions and just transitioned to a new position within society, which 
contextually adapts based on temporal progression. Yet the question still remains, who is 
truly insane? 
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